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Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance”
M. Todd Henderson∗
Introduction
The collapse of the housing bubble and the resulting credit crunch has
caused untold harm to the economy and the lives of millions by destroying
trillions of dollars in global wealth. The search for causes and remedies has begun
in earnest, and chief among these is the largely unregulated credit derivatives
market. Regulation of one form or another is the proposed solution in many
quarters, and one of the prominent proposals is insurance regulation. At the very
least, the analogy between credit derivatives and insurance is often made, and
this faulty comparison may lead regulators astray, regardless of the mode of
regulation ultimately chosen. This Essay explores the suitability of insurance
regulation to the credit derivatives market, concluding that it is a bad fit along
many dimensions. Regulation of some sort may indeed be needed to remedy
some fairly obvious market failures,1 but insurance regulation and regulators
have little if any role to play in any new regulatory regime.
The most basic form of credit derivative, known as a “credit default swap”
(CDS), is simply a contract through which a lender can protect against the risk of
default by paying premiums to a third party who agrees to make the lender whole
in the event of default by the underlying borrower. The surficial similarity to
typical insurance products, like property or life insurance, has caused some
politicians and pundits to argue that credit derivatives are a form of insurance
and should be regulated as such.2 The former director of the Commodities
∗

University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to the George J. Phocas Fund for research
support.
1 One market failure was the lack of a centralized clearinghouse to manage and reduce
counterparty risk in credit derivative transactions. The Federal Reserve and Treasury are
encouraging exchanges, like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, to handle these transactions. See
“USA
Exchanges:
Geithner
Pushes
for
Derivatives
Shake-Up,”
available
at
http://www.finreg21.com/news/usa-exchanges-geithner-pushes-derivatives-shake-up.
2 As shown supra, numerous politicians and observers have made the linkage. It has also
crept casually into numerous media accounts. For example, in an account of the AIG catastrophe
in the New Republic, the author calls credit derivatives insurance: “Between March, when
Greenberg left AIG, and the end of 2005, Cassano's division issued more than $40 billion in
credit-default swaps (essentially insurance) for portfolios of securities backed by subprime
mortgages. This was more than half of all the insurance of this type the company had on its
books.” Noam Scheiber, “A new theory of the AIG catastrophe,” THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 15,
2009. Legal scholars believe this too. See Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital
Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 181 (2007) (arguing that certain credit derivative contracts have “general
form and function reflect many basic insurance arrangements.”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The
AIG Bailout,” Working Paper, Mar. 5, 2009 (“A CDS certainly appears to fall within this definition
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Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which regulates most derivative products,
declared: “A credit default swap . . . is an insurance contract, but [the industry
has] been very careful not to call it that because if it were insurance, it would be
regulated.”3 New York State went even further. On September 22, 2008,
Governor David Patterson announced plans to regulate credit derivatives as
insurance under the auspices of the state’s insurance department.4 New York
State Insurance Commissioner Eric Dinallo then testified before a House
Committee investigating credit derivatives: “the insurance regulator for New
York is a relevant authority on credit default swaps,” because “[w]e believe . . .
[they are] insurance.”5 Although New York has delayed its regulatory plans
pending a federal review of credit derivative regulation,6 the question of whether
credit derivatives are insurance remains an open and much bandied about one
that needs to be analyzed.
This Essay argues that it makes little or no sense to regulate credit
derivatives as or like “insurance,” regardless of whether they are used as
insurance, that is, to reduce risk for one party. The instinct to call credit
derivatives “insurance” is sensible enough—the lender buying credit protection
looks much like an insured and the party selling credit protection looks much like
given that the protection seller contractually agrees to compensate the protection buyer following
the occurrence of a credit event.”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346552.
3 Interview of Dr. Michael Greenberger with Steve Kroft on “60 Minutes,” Oct. 5, 2008,
Transcript available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/05/60minutes/main4502454_page1.shtml.
Dr.
Greenberger argued that the industry was able to avoid regulation by simply using the word
“swap” instead of “insurance” to describe the transaction. See id. (“So they use a magic substitute
word called a 'swap,' which by federal law is deregulated.”). Swaps were specifically excluded from
regulation by the CFTC by the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000.
It is true that a typical CDS transaction does not involve a “swap” in the same way that an
interest rate swap does. In the latter case, two parties agree to swap risks: the holder of a fixedrate note agrees to swap that income stream with the holder of a variable-rate note. But while the
term swap is not technically accurate, it is difficult to imagine that insurance or other regulators
would be fooled by the label.
4 New York State Press Release: “Governor Patterson Announces Plan to Limit Harm to
Markets from Credit Derivatives,” available at
www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2008/p0809224.pdf. See also Danny Hakim, “New York State to
Regulate Credit Default Swaps,” NY TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23swap.html?ref=business (“The
governor said the state’s insurance department would begin regulating credit-default swaps as
insurance products in cases where the buyer of the swap also owns the underlying bond it is
meant to back.”).
5 Testimony of Eric Dinallo, New York State Insurance Commissioner, before the House
Agriculture Committee, Nov. 23, 2008, available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h91120/Dinallo.pdf.
6 See id. (“Based on the developments reported on by the President’s Working Group, it is
clear they are committed to comprehensive and effective federal oversight of credit default swaps.
. . . . Accordingly, New York will delay indefinitely our plan to regulate part of this market.”). It is
clear from Dinallo’s testimony that New York is using the threat of insurance regulation as a
weapon to encourage more comprehensive federal regulation.
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an insurer, at least where the protection seller is in privity with holders of notes
of indebtedness.7 The analogy is obvious: in a plain-vanilla CDS, the bank making
an original loan pays a premium to a third party that in turn agrees to make the
bank whole in the event of a future liability, that is, a default on the underlying
loan or bond. This transaction resembles a typical insurance contract, where the
insured pays a premium to a third party (an insurance company) in return for a
promise to make the insured whole in the event of a loss.
But observing that something resembles or provides insurance against loss
is not enough to warrant regulating it as “insurance.” Many contracts that are not
called insurance or regulated as insurance imbed some component of insurance
or risk sharing. For instance, when a farmer enters into a contract that allows the
farmer to sell wheat at a fixed price in the future—a forward contract called a put
option—the farmer is in effect insuring against a drop in the price of wheat. On
the other side of this transaction, there may be a baker who enters into a forward
contract that allows the baker to insure against an increase in the price of wheat.
Both parties are buying price insurance from each other, likely with a middleman,
known as a market maker, standing between and reducing the counterparty risk
in the transaction. But these contracts, and all similar hedging contracts entered
into by regular consumers and sophisticated financial entities, are not regulated
as insurance contracts.8 The point can be made more bluntly: it would be fanciful
to argue that every contract in which a party could be said to reducing its risk and
another party was willing to take on some of that risk is or should be called
insurance. If this were the case, state insurance regulators would be involved in
regulating hedge funds, commodities, options, swaps, and countless other
contracts entered into by consumers and firms. In fact, every contract assigns,
shares, and apportions some sort of risk. No one seriously advocates this scope
for insurance regulation. Simply providing some risk sharing is not enough to be
regulated by state insurance commissioners.
The reason insurance regulation does not extend to every contract that
involves some element of insuring risk has to do with the purpose of insurance
regulation, as opposed to other types of regulation. There are broadly two
justifications for a special law of insurance: first, the peculiar governance
problems associated with insurance firms; and second, worries about
unsophisticated consumers being duped by complicated and essential products.
This Essay will show that neither of these justifications obtains or makes sense
for the regulation of credit derivatives.
New York State has proposed regulating only these credit derivatives – about one-fifth of the
total market – because the argument that the parties are engaged in an insurance transaction is
more difficult in cases where they are simply wagering on the default without an actual interest in
the underlying debt instrument. See id.
8 Option contracts generally trade on exchanges, like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and
as such are regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
7
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Governance problems arise because insurance companies have an inverted
production cycle and do not generally have concentrated creditors like noninsurance firms. This means that two crucial constraints on the potential
misinvestment of resources are missing: the feedback to the firm provided by
product and other markets is missing given the fact that the insurance company
produces its product (that is, payment of claims) many years after the consumers
pay for it; and when things go badly for the insurance company, there is no
concentrated interest to keep the firm from adopting an excessively risky strategy
(from the perspective of creditors (that is, policy holders).
Insurance law is designed to prevent the risk that insurers competing for
policyholders, but unconstrained by normal forces, will charge too little for their
products. This happens because of the continuous nature of insurance company
inflows and outflows, coupled with a delinkage between the time of pricing a risk
and the time of paying out the loss from the risk. In other words, insurance can
look a bit like a Ponzi scheme, where new creditors of the firm are paying off the
liabilities to old creditors. And, just as in a Ponzi scheme, when things go badly
for the firm (that is, when actuarial estimates of liability turn out to be wrong),
there is a natural tendency to offer new investors an attractive return to increase
cash flows to pay for higher-than-estimated outflows.
The second part of the governance problem—the lack of concentrated
creditors—exacerbates this problem, since there is no sophisticated entity with
bargaining power that can keep the firm from adopting a shareholder-friendly,
go-to-Vegas strategy in the event liability estimates were erroneous. Without
these governance constraints, initial misestimates and mistakes can fester and
lead to large losses. This Essay shows how the counterparties in credit derivative
contracts do not have this continuous investment problem or these governance
problems, unless, of course, they are insurance companies, and how insurance
regulation would be futile in any event.
Consumer problems arise because the consumers of insurance company
products (and as such creditors of the insurance company) are average
individuals without the expertise or sophisticated judgment to assess what they
are buying in insurance products. The consumer-centric element of insurance
regulation consists of three commonly recited justifications: to make sure
insurers don’t charge too much; to regulate the substance and terms of policies;
and to regulate service and coverage issues. This basis for regulation is, to be
sure, driven by a rather dim view of the philosophy of caveat emptor, the wisdom
and skill of the average consumer, and the power of a small number of informed
individuals to set market prices for others. This Essay does not take on the
soundness of these consumer issues for insurance products, but simply compares
their rationale with what is known about the participants in credit derivative
contracts. Unlike the average consumer of insurance, the average participant in

Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance” / 5
credit derivative markets is large, sophisticated, and capable of bearing losses.
There is simply no basis for transferring the paternalistic impulses of insurance
to this market.
This Essay shows that neither the governance problem nor the consumer
abuse problem obtain in significant ways in the context of the credit derivatives
market. Section I introduces the basics of credit derivatives. Section II presents
the argument for regulating credit derivatives as insurance based on the rough
analogy describe above. Section III then shows why the simple fact that credit
derivatives sometimes result in risk sharing or transfer does not justify bringing
these contracts and the parties to them within the ambit of insurance law. Section
IV concludes by briefly sketching out what a sensible regulation of credit
derivatives might look like, contrasting this with the approach of insurance
regulation.
A PRIMER ON CREDIT DERIVATIVES

I.

Credit derivatives exist in many forms and flavors, but the essence is
simple: it may be more efficient for different entities to handle the various
aspects of lending. A typical loan has many parts, including: origination,
servicing, monitoring, and funding or risk bearing. In a world without risksharing mechanisms, all of these are contained within one entity, that is, a bank.
The bank has the relationships (origination), scale in the back office (servicing),
experience (monitoring), and cash from depositors (funding). But the bank might
not want to do all these things. It might want to become an arranger rather than a
lender. One reason is because federal regulations designed to protect depositors
require the bank to hold cash on hand to offset risk in loans.9
Another reason is that other potential lenders may be shut out of the
corporate lending market, say because they do not have relationships with
borrowers, but would provide a cheaper source of funding or be more efficient
holders of particular aspects of corporate borrowing risk. Smaller regional banks
and insurance companies come to mind here.
A final reason is that the bank may not be the most efficient monitor of
firm conduct. The bank has experience with monitoring in general and (likely)
with the specific borrower, but these advantages come with costs too. The
relationships that led to the loan may corrupt the monitoring function—a sort of
monitor capture by the borrower. Fees earned by banks for workouts and new
loans may also distort incentives. So too might the fact that the workout group for
a loan may be comprised of only a few individuals, who are subject to biases and
shortcomings that a larger, market-based monitoring mechanism might be able
Capital reserves required by the Basel Accords are non-productive, and therefore reduce a
bank’s return.
9
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to overcome. In short, there are many reasons why banks might prefer to
decouple the bundle of loan features, but cannot without financial contracts that
allow default risk to be shared. Credit derivatives, although much maligned as
result of current events, can help investors of various sorts allocate the lending
market to its most efficient participants.
There are many variations of credit derivatives, but to answer the
threshold question of whether credit derivatives in general can be considered
“insurance” it makes sense to consider the two most generic version: the credit
default swap (CDS) and the collateralized debt obligation (CDO).
A.

Credit Default Swaps

A CDS is a contract in which credit risk (that is, the expected losses arising
from defaults) is transferred from one party to another. A bank makes a loan to a
borrower. There is some risk that the borrower will default on the loan, causing
losses to the bank.10 Naturally, the bank wants to minimize these losses. The bank
can do this through ex ante selection (that is, due diligence during the
underwriting process), through ongoing monitoring of the borrower, and through
effective ex post workout procedures. The bank can also contact with a third party
to make the bank whole in the event the borrower defaults.
Consider a simple example: Bank holds on its balance sheet a $100 note
for a loan made to Borrower. Bank may want to shift some of the risk that
Borrower will not repay the loan, say because of costly federal capital adequacy
requirements that require Bank to hold some percentage of the loan’s
outstanding balance in cash reserves.11 For a period of (normally) five years,
Investor, who wants to hold risk of Borrower, agrees to make Bank whole in the
event of default, thus assuming the risk of default,12 in return for a stream of
periodic payments from Bank. Voilà, the risk of the loan to Borrower has been
swapped from Bank to Investor. The premium paid by the Bank is expressed as a
risk spread in basis points, say 100 basis points or 1 percent. For a $100 loan, this
would mean the bank would make quarterly payments of $0.25 to buy protection
on the note. (The spread, which expresses the risk of default during the five-year
term of protection, varies over time, allowing information about the quality of the
debtor to be revealed and allowing investors unrelated to the loan contract to
10 The default risk is only one of many risks embedded in a loan. Lenders (and borrowers) face
interest rate risks, volatility risk, currency risks, and so on. The significance of credit derivatives
(CDSs) is the ability to unpack and isolate credit risk, and allowed it to be transferred to others
who may be more efficient holders of it.
11 In general, US banks are subjected to the capital adequacy requirements of the so-called
Basel Accords, implemented by the Bank of International Settlements. See
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm.
12 Default risk is only one of many types of risk. Others include: interest rate risk,
counterparty risk, currency risk, and so on.
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speculate on changing credit quality for profit.) In the event of “default,”13 Bank
delivers the underlying credit instrument, in this case the loan, to Investor, and
Investor makes a payment to Bank that puts Bank in the position it would have
been in if Borrower had not defaulted.
These contracts constitute the primary market for credit derivatives since
the parties to the transaction interact with the underlying debt instrument: the
lender writes and initially holds the instrument, while the counterparty ends up
holding the instrument in the event of default, and, in any event, one of the two
parties to the contract will hold the underlying at the termination of the CDS
contract. The participants in this market are large commercial banks, as risk
sellers, and insurance companies, hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds, and
a mix of investment banks, commercial banks, and smaller regional banks, as risk
buyers.14 In this way, CDS contracts resemble other risk-sharing arrangements,
like the syndication of credit or the sale of loans by banks. Most large loans are
shared between a lead lender and other banks with which it contracts to share the
risk of default, and there is a large and robust market for the sale of all or parts of
loans to other banks. (Although risk sharing contracts, these are not considered
or regulated as insurance.)
Returning to the example above, Bank will want to reduce the $100 risk by
getting other investors to participate, both to reduce its own risk and also to
comply with capital adequacy rules. Bank could sell the loan, but this might mean
giving up its relationship with Borrower, something neither party might want.15
Shifting the risk using a CDS preserves this relationship—in fact, Borrower may
not even know the risk has been shifted—while also allowing conservative
investors, like insurance companies and pension funds, to participate in the
credit market.16 A small regional bank in Germany, an insurance company in
Indonesia, and a pension fund in California are thus able to achieve desired riskreturn investments in new ways.
The risk is not just swapped between two parties. In a typical CDS
contract, the risk can be swapped many times, so that there are numerous parties
in the risk-sharing chain. For instance, A, a manufacturing firm may borrow from
As described below, supra ___, the issue of when a credit derivative contract triggers
payment is a complicated and tricky issue.
14 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requestors, Credit
Derivatives: Confirmation Backlogs Increased Dealers’ Operational Risk, But Were Successfully
Addressed
After
Joint
Regulatory
Action
(2007),
6
n.
8,
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf (“The top five end-users of credit derivatives are
banks and broker-dealers (44 percent), hedge funds (32 percent), insurers (17 percent), pension
funds (4 percent), and mutual funds (3 percent).”).
15 Borrower might not want Bank to sell the loan, since this may signal something bad about
Borrower. The positive signal derived from having Bank be a creditor and monitor of Borrower
may be quite valuable, and for this reason, loan agreements often include no-sale clauses.
16 Conservatism here may derive internally, that is, from managers and shareholders, or from
regulation.
13

8 / Henderson
B, a commercial bank. B, not wanting to hold the risk, may pay a premium to C, a
dealer in CDS contracts, in return from a promise to be made whole if A defaults.
(C, like all protection sellers, will be required to post some collateral with B to
ensure payment on this obligation.) Since C is a dealer, it will look for a buyer
willing to provide the ultimate risk-bearing function. D, an insurance company,
agrees to make C whole in the event of a default by A in return for premium
payments by C. Then E, a different commercial bank, wants exposure to A’s credit
risk, so it may agree to make D whole in the event of a default by A, in return for
the payment of premiums by D. And on and on and on. There is no limit on the
number of links in the risk-sharing chain, and, in practice, credit risk is often
transferred dozens of times after its original creation. A typical credit derivative
contract had hundreds of investors selling protection for hundreds of lenders and
even more underlying borrowers. In the mortgage securitization market, for
example, one of the problems in collapse of US house prices was figuring out who
actually held the risk of mortgage default so that workouts or foreclosures could
happen efficiently.17
As discussed below, although C, D, E, and parties on down the chain could
be said to be providing risk-sharing contracts in this example, it would be a
dramatic expansion of the concept of insurance regulation to call them insurance
companies. These entities might be individuals, banks, hedge funds, university
endowments, or any other pool of investment money looking for return. In
addition, the kind of insurance they are providing is not dissimilar from the
insurance provided by nearly every contract that involves risk sharing (that is,
every contract), and therefore raises irresolvable line drawing problems. The
closest entity to an insurance company is, C the original CDS dealer. But, as
discussed below, these are brokers who are regulated by numerous securities and
banking laws, and subject to the oversight of numerous federal regulators.
CDS contracts do have characteristics similar to typical insurance
contracts. Specifically, risk sharing and information asymmetries inevitably give
rise to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Bank knows more about
default risk of Borrower than the counterparties, and therefore the latter may be
unwilling to sell protection on the notes Bank brings to the market, since the
counterparties may believe these are the debtors most likely to default. Another
problem is that the existence of credit protection may make Bank less diligent in
its monitoring role, thereby increasing the risk of default as a result of the risksharing contract. In theory and practice, there are steps that can be taken to
mitigate these risks. Bank can hold back a portion of the risk of default, perhaps
the first-loss position, thereby giving it incentives to monitor. This is analogous to
a deductible in insurance contracts, and it can address both the moral hazard and
See, e.g., Mike McIntire, “Tracking Loans Through a Firm That Holds Millions,” NY TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/business/24mers.html.
17
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adverse selection problem. (As it turns out, however, the nature of the
securitization process made these first-loss tranches more valuable, on a riskadjusted basis, than their price, while more senior tranches were less valuable.)
These problems and the steps taken to mitigate them are discussed below.
There is also a rich secondary market in which the risk of default of a
particular borrower (known as a “reference entity”) is traded among parties that
have no contact with or affiliation with either the borrower or the lender. For
instance, auto parts maker Delphi had $2 billion in bonds outstanding at the time
it declared bankruptcy, but there were over $25 billion in credit derivative bets
outstanding on whether or not Delphi would default on those bonds.18 The term
“bet” is chosen deliberately, since these contracts are nothing more than wagers
on whether Delphi would default. (As a side note, we do not regulate these bets as
gambling for the same reason that the secondary market in stocks, that is, the
New York Stock Exchange, is not regulated as gambling, even though it is. The
reason is that the gambling is socially useful.) This large ratio of secondary to
primary market is common across companies used as reference entities. After all,
there is nothing (other than perhaps gambling law) that prevents two parties
from writing a contract that replicates the payoffs from the payment or default of
any debt instrument entered into anywhere. These contracts are called
“synthetic,” since they do not involve any physical obligations to deliver on the
underlying debt instrument.
The proposals to date to regulate credit derivatives have focused entirely
on the primary market, specifically disclaiming any authority over the secondary
market. As discussed below, this has something to do with what insurance
experts call “insurable interest,” which is a requirement that the party allegedly
doing the insuring has to pay only when party that is allegedly insured actually
suffers a harm unrelated to the insurance contract. But once regulators limit
control over one part of the market, the fungibility of financial products will allow
investors to move to other unregulated products that give them the same mix of
risk and return. This is discussed further below.
B.

Collateralized Debt Obligations

The other type of basic credit derivative is a collateralized debt obligation
(CDO). A CDO is, at its core, the same as a CDS contract.19 As in a CDS contract,
the parties to a CDO contract are shifting the risk of an underlying debt
18 The Ballooning Credit Derivatives Market: Easing Risk or Making It Worse?
Published: November 02, 2005 in Knowledge@Wharton, available at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1303.
19 In the nomenclature, if the underlying is a bond, the instrument is called a CDO, while if it
is a loan, it is called a CLO.
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instrument from lender to investor, but instead of doing so for a corporate loan or
bond issuance from a single borrower they do so for a series of loans or bonds
from many borrowers. In this way, some portfolio theory-based diversification is
achieved, since the risk for any investor of any one buyer defaulting is absorbed
by gains on other debtors that do not default.
Here is a cartoon of how the basic, plain-vanilla CDO is formed. A CDO
manager, usually an investor specializing in these products from a large
investment house like Goldman Sachs, forms a special purpose vehicle (SPV),
basically a stand-alone, bankruptcy-remote firm, and then chooses loans or
bonds or mortgages from many borrowers to put into the SPV. The SPV then sells
interests in the cash flows it will generate from these debt contracts to numerous
investors. The SPV generates cash from the instruments it holds as the borrowers
pay back the debts. This cash is then distributed to the investors according to the
terms of their investment. So far, the SPV creating the CDO looks like any firm
selling a service or product. The SPV raises money from investors, uses this
money to invest in assets (in this case, debt instruments), manages the assets,
and then distributes the profits it earns to the investors.
SPVs investing in credit derivatives have two somewhat unique features
that enable them to be attractive risk-sharing mechanisms: tranching and
securitization. The concepts are quite simple.
In a normal debt investment, a group of investors share a vertical slice of
the expected payouts from a debtor. Three investors funding a $100 loan to a
firm each bear exactly the same risk if the borrower defaults—as the recovery on
the loan falls from $100 to, say, $80, each investor suffers a 20 percent loss. In a
securitized debt investment, by contrast, the same three investors can slice the
risk horizontally, instead of vertically, allowing them to assign different payouts,
called “tranches,” based on the amount of recovery. For example, the investments
could be structured such that the first investor bears the first $10 in losses, the
second the next $10, and the third investor the remaining $70. In that case, if the
$100 loan falls in value to $80, the first two investors would suffer complete
losses, while the third investor would suffer none (although its risk would
increase, since any additional diminution in value would impair its position).
This approach can dramatically reduce the probability of default for a particular
tranche, and thus make even risky debt investment attractive for conservative
investors. For example, the third investor reduces the riskiness of its investment
by investing in the second type of vehicle. Insurance companies, which
traditionally invest in only relatively safe instruments, used this approach to
expand the types of investment they made.
The sharing and recategorization of risk can be enhanced by pooling
together many risks through a process called securitization. This can be seen
through a simple example. Consider two banks loaning to two companies in
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different and uncorrelated industries. The loans both pay $100 in the good state
of the world and $0 in the bad state of the world, with a probability of default of
10 percent. If the banks take vertical positions, the expected value of the loans for
each bank is $90. Each faces the identical risks.
If instead, the cash flows from the two loans are pooled and tranched in a
CDO, the 10 percent risk of default can be reduced for one of the investors. If one
of the banks bears the first $100 in losses and the second loses only if both
borrowers default (and assuming the defaults are not correlated), the risk of
default for the senior bank falls from 10 percent to 1 percent.20 The expected
value for the two banks is thus $90 for the junior bank and $99 for the senior
bank. The process can be extended indefinitely, with each additional risk added
to the pool further reducing the risk up the tranching scheme. For instance,
adding a third investor and a third uncorrelated loan to the pool reduces the risk
for most senior bank, which suffers only if all three firms fail, to 0.1 percent.21
Even when considering the role of tranching and securitization, the
structure of a CDO is roughly the same as any firm in any business—they are
nothing new under the Sun. Tranching is just a fancy way of saying that the SPV
replicates the priority of liquidation claims created by bankruptcy law and
contract for other firms. When a firm liquidates, equity interests lose first, and
because of the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy, more junior interests, like
unsecured creditors, lose only after equity interests are wiped out. This is true
whether the firm is a donut maker or SPV holding debt instruments in a CDO
structure. In addition, as discussed below, the shareholders investing in a
traditional firm are selling insurance to the firm’s debt holders, managers, and
other stakeholders in the same way that the protection sellers are for the original
bank in a credit derivative contract. Equity provides a downside cushion, since no
payments are legally due equity holders, and thus provides risk sharing on
favorable terms for holders of fixed claims on a firm’s balance sheet.
Unlike regular firms, however, SPVs holding credit derivatives generally
have only a single investment period. Whereas an insurance company is
constantly adding new policy holders, SPVs are typically formed, buy debt
instruments, raise money to fund the risk of these instruments, and then make
payouts according to the terms of the credit derivative contracts. As mentioned
above and discussed more fully below, this distinction is a crucial factor in the
appropriateness of insurance regulation.

The loss for the senior bank is the probability of firm one defaulting (10 percent) times the
probability of firm two defaulting (10 percent).
21 Correlation of risks is obviously the key assumption in the creation of a CDO. If the risks in
the three-bond case are perfectly correlated (that is, the failure of one firm means all three firms
will fail), then the probability of loss for all three investors is the same 10 percent, and there are
thus no credit reduction benefits from securitization.
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Before moving to the merits of the arguments for and against regulating
credit derivatives as insurance, it is important to point out a few other features of
credit derivative markets. First, the CDO market is at least two times larger than
the CDS market. At the height of these markets in 2007, the single-name CDS
market (that is, an entity selling protection to a bank for a loan to a single
company) had a notional value of about $20 trillion, while the total credit
derivatives market was about $60 trillion in notional value.22 This means that the
CDO market, which makes up the rest of the market, was about $40 trillion, or
twice as big as the single-name CDS market.
Second, there are numerous index products and more complicated CDO
products (such as the CDO2) that allow individual investors to buy exposure to a
portfolio of credit derivative investments. For instance, in the single-name CDS
world, there are several indexes, like the Dow Jones “Investment Grade CDX”
and the “High Yield CDX,” that consist of over 100 borrowing firms of different
credit quality. Investors can buy securities that track these indices in the same
way they can invest in the S&P 500 or Wilshire 5000 equity indices. (As
discussed below, investments in these indices are no more providing insurance to
the underlying participants in the borrowing transaction than a regular firm
selling equity, since both provide mechanisms of risk sharing.) Moreover, firms
or investors seeking exposure to these credit default risks often hold a portfolio of
risks or an index product for a few months or less, rolling the investments on a
fairly constant basis to meet the investors’ or firms’ balance sheet needs.23 As
such, the investors in credit derivative indexes are not generally exposed to the
possibility of actually having to pay for any losses on the original debt, but rather
are susceptible to the change in the price of the indexed securities depending on
the changing nature of the credit quality of the underlying borrower.
A CDO2 (and more exotic credit derivative products) basically achieves the
same result for portfolio products. A CDO2 is simply a two-pool portfolio of
tranched and securitized loans in which investors face exposure to both pools. If
the credit risks are not perfectly correlated, this structure allows investors to
lower their overall risk to something less than they would have from investing in
both pools separately. These products also allow investors to invest in funds of
CDO products, in which the exposure becomes more and more attenuated from
any individual underlying borrower and starts to look more like generic risk
exposure to the debt markets or even the market in general. As the case of CDS
indexes, the investors in these products can now be thought of as merely

22 See http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/02/some-more-facts-about-how-cdsmarket.html.
23 Interview with executive at insurance company responsible for credit derivative
transactions, on March 21, 2009.
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identifying a unique risk-return investment as opposed to making bets about the
credit quality of individual borrowers or pools of borrowers.
THE ARGUMENT FOR REGULATING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AS INSURANCE

II.

At first blush, the similarity between property (or other) insurance and
credit derivative contracts makes the call for insurance regulation of the latter
seem reasonable. But a better case than that must be made, because deeming
something “insurance” brings with it a special set of laws and rules administered
by state insurance departments. This would mean significant increases in the cost
of using credit derivatives, and, on the margin, less use of them. This might be
fine, but we need to believe that insurance regulation brings us something worth
the price. The benefits of the regulation, therefore, must be well calibrated to the
particular risks involved, lest otherwise socially beneficial transactions be
deterred. This Part fleshes out the analogy between insurance and credit
derivatives, while the next section shows how this analysis is highly misleading by
looking behind the analogy to the purposes and justifications for calling
something “insurance.”
The standard definition of “insurance” is an “agreement in which one
party (the insurer), in exchange for consideration provide by the other party (the
insured), assumes the other party’s risk and distributes it across a group of
similarly situated persons, each of whose risk has been assumed in a similar
transaction.”24 There are two parts of this definition—(1) risk transfer; and (2)
risk pooling. The insurer assumes not only the risk of loss, but distributes the risk
across many other similarly situated individuals or entities, so as to reduce
unpredictable events into a more predictable cash flow stream. In technical
jargon, insurance companies try to pool risk by attracting a sufficiently large
number of diverse policyholders such that the law of large numbers will reduce
the aggregate variance of claims.
The credit derivative contracts discussed above have many characteristics
that seem to fit well within the scope of at least the first part of this definition. As
in a typical insurance contract, a CDS contract involves a party with an asset (the
loan)25 with a risk of loss (default by the borrower), paying a reoccurring
premium to a counterparty, which in turn agrees to make the first party whole the
event there is a loss. To analogize, just as a homeowner that pays a monthly
premium to an insurance carrier in return for a promise to make the homeowner
ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 14 (__).
The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “insurance” is “a practice or arrangement by which
a company . . . provides a guarantee of compensation for specified loss . . . in return for payment
of a premium.” This definition misses a key component of insurance – the pooling of risk.
25 The underlying credit instrument need not be a loan, but could be any debt instrument,
such as a mortgage, bond, note, or any other form of indebtedness.
24

14 / Henderson
whole in the event of a loss related to the home, so too does the lender pay a
monthly premium to a third party in return for a promise to make the bank whole
in the event of a loss related to the loan. If this analogy holds, the lender is the
“insured” and the counterparty is the “insurer.” And, the insurance law of the fifty
states would then regulate the insurer and the content of contracts it enters into
with insureds.
Building on the apparent similarity between typical insurance contracts
(regulated by state insurance agencies) and credit derivatives, New York State
recently proposed deeming credit derivatives as “insurance.” The chief state
regulator, Eric Dinallo, offered the rationale during testimony before a
congressional committee: “With [plain-vanilla CDS contracts], if the issuer of a
bond defaults, then the owner of the bond has suffered a loss and the [CDS]
provides some recovery for that loss.”26 Dinallo limited the reach of the proposed
regulations of credit derivatives, however, by asserting the state’s jurisdiction
covered only cases where the credit derivative contract is between an original
lender and a third-party investor, that is, single-name CDS contracts in which an
individual or entity sells protection to an originating bank.27 These are so-called
“covered” transactions (as opposed to “naked” ones), since there is privity
between the insured and the underlying debt instrument. The reason for this
limited scope for insurance regulation is based on a generally accepted argument
that the party being insured have an “insurable interest” in the underlying
amount at risk under the contract. In other words, a contract is “insurance” only
if the insuring party pays when the insured party actually suffers a harm
unrelated to the insurance contract.
This concept can be illustrated by comparing the primary and secondary
credit derivative markets. Where a bank issues a loan and then buys credit
protection on that loan that pays off if the loan defaults, the argument is that the
buyer of credit protection has an insurable interest in the loan, and the protection
acts as insurance against this loss. In the secondary market, by contrast, two
parties unrelated to the issuance of the loan (and without the knowledge of the
bank making the loan, the borrower taking out the loan, and any parties
contracting with either of them), bet on whether or not the borrower will repay
the loan. According to the conventional wisdom of insurance regulation, this bet
is not insurance. The reason for this concession is that otherwise “insurance”
Testimony of Eric Dinallo, New York State Insurance Commissioner, before the House
Agriculture Committee, Nov. 23, 2008, available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h91120/Dinallo.pdf.
27 Id. (“We believe that the first type of swap, let’s call it the covered swap, is insurance. The
essence of an insurance contract is that the buyer has to have a material interest in the asset or
obligation that is the subject of the contract. That means the buyer owns property or a security
and can suffer a loss from damage to or the loss of value of that property. With insurance, the
buyer only has a claim after actually suffering a loss.”).
26
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would include far too much and things far beyond the ken, expertise, or
conceivable reach of state insurance regulators.
The concession is manifest in the findings of insurance regulators. For
instance, in 2000 after Congress exempted “swaps” and other derivatives from
certain regulation,28 the New York Insurance Department was asked whether
credit derivatives were in fact insurance, which would be subject to state
regulation. The question it was asked by federal regulators was: “Does a credit
default swap transaction, wherein the seller will make payment to the buyer upon
the happening of a negative credit event and such payment is not dependent
upon the buyer having suffered a loss, constitute a contract of insurance under
the insurance law?”29 This question is aimed at the secondary market, and was
answered in the negative for reasons of a lack of privity with the loss on the part
of the entities engaging in the derivative transaction. In his testimony before the
House, Commissioner Dinallo distinguished this prior finding of the New York
State Insurance Commission that credit derivatives were not insurance, by
pointing out that the question asked was focused only on non-privity cases or
“naked” credit derivatives.30 From this, Dinallo concluded that a different result
could obtain in the privity case (that is, CDS contracts), since the protection seller
was insuring a real loss outside of the context of the contract. The analogy
described above was thus sufficient for him to conclude that, with privity and a
real potential loss, credit derivatives of the plain-vanilla CDS variety are
insurance products.
The argument is not preposterous on its face. Insurance is about risk
sharing, and in that sense credit derivatives, which are fundamentally risksharing contracts, are akin to insurance. But, as shown below, the fact that credit
derivative contracts are providing an insuring or risk-hedging function does not
mean that it is sensible or efficient to regulate them as insurance. There are lots
of contracts in which one party is effectively offering insurance as part of the deal,
and yet none of these are regulated by state insurance commissioners. The reason
is the underlying policy justifications for having a separate body of insurance law
do not reach these contracts, and thus applying that law would raise the costs of
the contracts without any likely benefit. Another reason is that the second part of
the definition of insurance—risk pooling—is absent in many of these transactions,
as it is in most CDS contracts. In fact, if there is any risk pooling by protection
See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 or CFMA (H.R. 5660 and S. 3283; see
also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, Pub.L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted November 12, 1999.
29 Testimony of Eric Dinallo, New York State Insurance Commissioner, before the House
Agriculture Committee, Nov. 23, 2008, available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h91120/Dinallo.pdf.
30 “So at the same time, in 2000, the New York Insurance Department was asked a very
carefully crafted question. “See id.
28
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sellers (the alleged insurers), it occurs in CDO contracts or secondary-market
CDSs, exactly the place where New York claims its regulatory reach does not
extend. These arguments are made in the next Part.
A few other features shared by insurance and credit derivatives provide
some support for the analogy to insurance. The first similarity between insurance
and credit derivatives is the incomplete nature of the risk transfer. The insured
(either the homeowner or the lender) swaps the risk of loss with respect to the
underlying asset (either the home or the loan) for the risk that the insurer will not
be able to make the insured whole. This latter risk is called “counterparty risk,”
and it is a central justification for insurance regulation. An individual who takes
out an automobile insurance policy is swapping the risk of loss from an auto
accident for the risk of loss that the insurance company will not be around to pay
the claim. Capital adequacy rules, investment restrictions, and other aspects of
insurance regulation exist to decrease this counterparty risk. Although CDSs and
other credit derivatives share this similar feature, as discussed below, this alone
does not justify regulating them as insurance as there are many other ways of
reducing the counterparty risk problem that do not involve the full panoply of
insurance regulations.
The second similarity between insurance and credit derivatives is the
presence of moral hazard. Whenever risk is transferred, there is the possibility of
misbehavior on the part of the transferor or the transferee. If the transferor (that
is, the bank) has an obligation to prevent the loss from occurring, say by
monitoring the conduct of the borrower, the transfer of risk reduces the incentive
to do this on the margin. In addition to shirking, protection buyers may act
deliberately to force the debtor into bankruptcy, say by withholding lending that
would otherwise be efficient or by invoking covenants outside the normal usage
in the industry. These examples of destroying value to simply collect on a CDS
contract can obtain in both the primary and secondary markets—nothing
prevents the holder of synthetic protection, say a hedge fund, from taking steps to
harm the borrower in order to collect on its bet. Although plausible, this facial
similarity does not justify treating credit derivatives as insurance. As discussed
below, this argument proves too much. Numerous opportunities exist for similar
moral hazard problems outside of the insurance context, there already exist
mechanisms (both market and from industry trade groups) to ameliorate any
moral hazard, and there is nothing about insurance law that makes it a good fit
for further reducing these potential harms, if they are substantial.
An additional argument for regulating credit derivatives as insurance is
the absence of any existing regulation by other federal or state agencies,
especially of certain players in the market, like hedge funds and other private
pools of money. Many experts and pundits blame the lack of regulation of the
credit derivatives market as contributing to the credit crisis. The argument goes
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like this: credit derivatives are not traded on an exchange, but rather through
individualized contracts, known as the over-the-counter market, and the lack of
regulation, either directly or indirectly through regulation of the exchanges on
which securities trade, allowed private parties to externalize systemic risk costs
onto society. The lack of regulation thus generated an inefficient number or type
of these transactions from a social welfare standpoint.
There may be something to the premise of this argument, that is, that the
lack of regulation exacerbated the risk that private parties would act in ways that
would be privately optimal but increase the risk of a global financial meltdown.
The premise is debatable, but even if it is true, this Essay shows that insurance
regulation is not the only way in which these systemic costs can be internalized by
firms. Most obviously, direct regulation of the credit derivatives market by
existing federal departments responsible for derivatives and markets, such as
requiring derivatives to be traded on an exchange, is possible under current law.
In fact, it seems from the public statements of New York officials that the
purpose of the characterization of credit derivatives as insurance is intended to
stoke federal regulators to act, more than a firm belief that credit derivatives are
insurance. After all, if they are insurance, then there should in fact be no need for
or call for federal regulation. In testimony before Congress and other public
comments, New York State’s insurance officials “stopped short of endorsing
comprehensive state-level regulation of this privately negotiated market” and
agreed to delay its plan to regulate credit derivatives based on the indication that
federal regulators are “committed to comprehensive and effective federal
oversight of credit default swaps.”31 The fact that Commissioner Dinallo’s
testimony outlined a propose regulatory agenda for federal agencies also supports
the threat-of-regulation-as-leverage claim.32
A final argument for state-based insurance regulation is the fact that
numerous insurance companies were involved in the credit derivatives markets
as buyers and sellers of protection, as well as acting as brokers and speculators in
secondary markets. According to one estimate, insurance companies represented
about 20 percent of end users of credit derivatives.33 For instance, insurance
Testimony of Eric Dinallo, New York State Insurance Commissioner, before the House
Agriculture Committee, Nov. 23, 2008, available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/110/h91120/Dinallo.pdf.
32 Dinallo testified that “Effective regulation of credit default swaps should include the
following provisions: All sellers must maintain adequate capital and post sufficient trading
margins to minimize counterparty risk; A guaranty fund should be created that ensures that a
failure of one seller will not create a cascade of failures in the market; There must be clear and
inclusive dispute resolution mechanisms; To ensure transparency and permit monitoring,
comprehensive market data should be collected and made available to regulatory authorities; The
market must have comprehensive regulatory oversight, and regulation cannot be voluntary.”
33 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requestors, Credit
Derivatives: Confirmation Backlogs Increased Dealers’ Operational Risk, But Were Successfully
Addressed
After
Joint
Regulatory
Action
(2007),
6
n.
8,
available
at
31
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giant AIG, invested heavily in credit derivatives of various kinds—its portfolio of
CDSs reached $526 billion at its height.34 And it is widely viewed that the losses
on these credit derivatives—over $30 billion in 2007 and 2008 alone—were the
cause of the failure of AIG and the need for the massive government bailout.35
The logic of regulation would thus be that these products were misused by
insurance companies, among others, and this justifies regulating them as
insurance. President Obama seemed to endorse this view when he described the
situation as follows: "You've got a company, AIG, which used to be just a regular
old insurance company. Then they decided--some smart person decided--let's put
a hedge fund on top of the insurance company and let's sell these derivative
products to banks all around the world."36
As discussed below, this argument proves too much, as many other
entities, like banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and so on, used credit
derivatives too, often disastrously but just as often fantastically, and therefore
there is nothing special about the end users that justifies treating them as
insurance. If anything, the fact that some insurance companies were harmed by
them justifies different regulation on insurance companies.
III.

THE ARGUMENT
INSURANCE

AGAINST

REGULATING CREDIT DERIVATIVES

AS

This Part presents several conceptual and practical reasons why credit
derivatives should not be regulated as insurance products or why sellers of credit
protection should not be regulated as insurance companies. Notwithstanding the
surficial appeal of the analogy between insurance contracts and credit derivative
contracts, the policy justifications for special rules regulating insurance carriers
and contracts do not obtain in the credit derivative context. Examining the
rational for insurance law and the important differences with credit derivatives
will show this.
The two primary reasons for having a separate body of insurance law are
the particular governance problems associated with insurance companies and the
fact that insureds are typically unsophisticated individuals for whom insurance is
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf (“The top five end-users of credit derivatives are
banks and broker-dealers (44 percent), hedge funds (32 percent), insurers (17 percent), pension
funds (4 percent), and mutual funds (3 percent).”).
34 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The AIG Bailout,” Working Paper, Mar. 5, 2009 (“A CDS
certainly appears to fall within this definition given that the protection seller contractually agrees
to compensate the protection buyer following the occurrence of a credit event.”), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346552.
35 Id.
36 See “Transcript: President Barack Obama on ‘The Tonight Show with Jay Leno,” NY TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/us/politics/20obama.text.html.
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essential and may difficult to obtain in the event of certain individual
characteristics. (These two justifications correspond with the two major features
of insurance law—the regulation of insurance company investments and the
regulation of sales to individuals.) Neither of these reasons justifies applying
insurance law to credit derivatives.
Before addressing these reasons for insurance law, this Part addresses the
reasons why policy arguments are needed in the first place. The primary reason
insurance contracts are treated differently than other contracts (and “insurance
law” is a separate body of law) is not because of their nature as “insurance” but
rather because they are issued by insurance companies. This conclusion is
evident from numerous problems that would arise in extending the reach of
insurance regulation to all contracts providing some kind of insurance.
A. Providing Insurance Is Not Enough
1. Line-Drawing Problems
It could not be enough for a contract that insures against risk to be
regulated as insurance or to bring the seller of that insurance within the ambit of
(state-based) insurance regulation. Every contract has a degree of insurance
embedded in it, and options and derivatives of all sorts, which are not considered
insurance or regulated as such, are mostly about insuring or hedging against risk.
If insurance law covered all contracts that are partially or completely about
insurance, the line drawing problems about what is insurance would likely
broaden the scope of insurance law to cover vastly more than it currently does.
The result would be to add regulatory costs and uncertainty to a vast swath of the
economy, with little or no expected benefit.
Consider a simple options contract, known as a forward contract: Farmer
agrees to sell wheat in six months at a given price (a put option) and Baker agrees
to buy wheat in six months at a given price (a call option). Both Farmer and
Baker are purchasing price insurance from each other—insurance against a price
rise (for Baker) and against a price drop (for Farmer)—by locking in a set price in
advance. The contract is not regulated as insurance, and neither Farmer nor
Baker are currently regulated as insurance companies, even though each may be
providing insurance to the other. There are several reasons for this result. Both
parties are presumably somewhat sophisticated, since they went in search of
derivative hedging tools, or are intermediated by market professionals. These
gatekeepers compete in competitive markets and are regulated by other laws and
exchange-based rules to ensure fidelity to their clients’ interests and a suitability
between client needs and products sold to them. In addition, the derivative
contracts are likely made either on a competitive derivatives exchange or as the
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result of arms’-length negotiation.37
There are innumerable contracts that provide the same type of insurance
as a forward contract does and that are not regulated as insurance. Any hedging
contract has an element of insurance. For instance, an investor who is long a
particular security, commodity, or investment might want to reduce the risk of
the position by entering into an another investment or contract with a third party
that moves the other way. The third party might be thought of as providing some
insurance for the investor, but this is not how the contract is thought of or
regulated. As discussed below, contracts like these have many purposes, and
trying to sort contracts along this dimension is likely to be costly and highly
imperfect, especially if done in ex post litigation, where litigant opportunism and
hindsight bias will be problematic, or by regulators, who will face inevitable
public choice problems in their definitional exercises.
One can imagine trying to sort between these two categories of contracts
by inquiring into the minds of the contracting parties to see whether the contract
was about insurance or something else. As noted above, this would require the
mind of the parties to every contract to be examined to determine whether they
are providing or seeking “insurance.” Regulators would need to know whether the
investor was entering into the contract for insurance or hedging purposes. This is
not generally the inquiry regulators make, perhaps because the question of
knowledge is malleable and costly to enforce, especially given imperfect courts
and a costly litigation system. Another dividing line could be the intent of the
investor, but this too is an unhelpful and costly line to draw. It may be
significantly overinclusive, and it is susceptible to similar proof problems as
knowledge. There may be mixed motives for all investments—return, hedging,
speculation, and so on—that will be difficult to unpack accurately and without
being subject to ex post bias, power grabs by regulators, and rent seeking by
stakeholders of the firms in question.
Rather, some contracts tend to be primarily about insurance, while others
have multiple functions, some of which might be about risk sharing. The former
might fall within the ambit of insurance regulation, while the latter never do. But
where is this line? Consider, for instance, equity investments in run-of-the-mill
firms. As discussed above, any equity investment in any firm could be thought of
as insurance in the same way that credit derivatives are. After all, when a firm
issues equity interests to investors, it is entering into a risk-sharing contract (on
Nor is the result different if a third party sells the insurance to Farmer or Baker. For
instance, a individual unconnected with the farming or baking business may believe that wheat
prices will rise/fall in six months based on predictions about weather, changes in supply or
demand, or other factors. This individual can enter into a forward contract with Farmer or Baker
either directly or through an options exchange, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. These
exchanges are populated with relatively sophisticated parties and are covered by alternative
regulatory regimes, including licensing requirements for brokers and dealers.
37
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behalf of managers, creditors, and other stakeholders) with these investors.
Equity holders, unlike debt holders, have no fixed claim on a firm’s assets, and
therefore provide a source of funding that is less sensitive to downturns in
performance than debt. A firm that has more equity on its balance sheet is, all
else being equal, less risky than a firm that has less. So we could recharacterize a
firm’s decision to issue equity (to lower its debt to equity ratio) as buying
insurance (against a downturn in the firm’s affairs) and the investors buying the
equity as selling insurance to the firm. Of course, no one thinks of equity in this
way. But equity is as much about insurance as credit derivatives are.
One reason securities are not regulated as insurance is the fact that equity
investments are regulated by a separate body of law—securities law—specifically
designed to address the policy challenges of issuing and investing in securities.
When Congress passed the securities laws in the 1930s, it could have simply
called equity investments insurance and delegated regulation to state insurance
law under the same theories as those calling for this treatment of credit
derivatives. But this would have been a reach—although arguably insurance,
equity securities are sufficiently different along numerous dimensions to justify a
separate body of regulatory law.
Another reason equity might not be regulated as insurance is because of
the particular characteristics of the contracts in question. As noted above, typical
credit derivative contracts look like typical insurance contracts: one party makes
periodic payments to another in return for a make-whole promise in the event of
a future occurrence. This similarity is only a surficial one, however, since there
are many other aspects of credit derivative contracts that are quite different. For
instance, payments may not turn on actual losses, there may be no pooling of
risk, the make-whole promise may be purely synthetic, and so on. In addition, it
is hard to imagine regulatory treatment turning solely on the question of whether
risk-sharing payments are made on a periodic basis (as in insurance contracts) or
a lump sum basis (as in equity investments, forward contracts, and so on). This
would elevate form over substance in an arbitrary way not anticipated by the
parties, and would provide an easy roadmap to avoiding any regulation.
Finally, few if any investor making an equity investment think they are
providing insurance. Rather, the investment is made for a whole host of reasons,
including pure investment, speculation, hedging, and so forth. Credit derivatives
are used for these multiple reasons too, and this cuts strongly against trying to
narrowly pigeonhole them as insurance.
2. Credit Derivatives Are Not Just about Reducing Risk
Another problem with regulating credit derivatives as insurance is that
they are not just (or, even, primarily) used for “insurance” purposes. As noted
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above, a common use, but only about one-fifth of the current market, is the
buying and selling of credit protection on loans, bonds, and other sources of
indebtedness. It is doubtful that this use fits squarely within the regulatory
definition of insurance or that insurance regulation would be beneficial to these
markets, but importantly for definitional purposes swapping credit risk is only
one of the many uses of these financial products.
Credit derivatives can be used to hedge risks independent of and unrelated
to the original loan or bond being used as a reference entity. For example, a
hedge fund that wants to reduce its exposure on, say, Russian wheat futures, may
find a corporate bond risk whose risk offsets its commodity position favorably,
and thus enter into a contract with a third party, who might be hedging Texas oil
prices, who is willing to pay in the event the bond defaults. This transaction has
nothing to do with the underlying bonds, since it only uses them as a reference
for calculating a stream of payments. The transaction is akin to two individuals in
China betting on whether I will crash my car. Neither of them is insuring me, but
rather they are simply using the probability of me crashing my car (and the
amount of damage that will result) as a reference for assigning risk among them.
(The original debtor in credit derivative contracts is called a “reference entity,” a
description that well captures this concept.) These bets are not considered
insurance, because there is no privity with party suffering a loss (that is, the
lenders in the case of a default by the borrower on the bond or me in the case I
crash my car) and furthermore no proof required that an actual loss be suffered.
Even if these bets were considered insurance, it would be impossible to regulate
all of them in this way. Detecting them would be difficult and costly, and, even if
possible, would simply direct the parties into transactions of similar risk-return
combinations but other designs. In other words, if regulators deem one class of
credit derivatives “insurance,” and thereby impose increased regulatory costs on
that class, and deem another class of credit derivative contracts as “not
insurance,” parties will naturally structure their transactions as the not-insurance
kind. More on this later.
Credit derivatives are also used for speculation about credit risk. Investors
can use credit derivative contracts to speculate on the default probability of a
particular borrower. In general, there are no insurance contracts like this.
Participants in insurance markets do not wager on whether an individual’s
probability of dying or crashing a car is rising or falling on a daily basis, as they
do with firm risk in credit derivative markets. Insurance is based on probabilities
at the macro level and across large numbers based on actuarial science, and,
when it is based on individuals characteristics, it is done only at the point of
origination and not for speculation purposes. But this is exactly what is done with
credit derivative contracts. For example, an investor who believes that General
Electric’s credit quality is likely to worsen over the next few years can buy
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protection against default by GE on its debt. If the credit quality does deteriorate,
the cost of protection will rise, and the investor will earn a profit. Similarly, if an
investor believes that GE’s credit quality is likely to improve, it can sell protection
against default by GE. If the credit quality does improve, the cost of protection
will fall, and the investor will earn a profit. Before credit derivatives this kind of
speculation was extremely difficult, as it is practically impossible to short bonds
or loans. The credit derivative market thus allows for information about debt
quality to be processed in a market, perhaps with large gains to capital allocation
efficiency. Like the hedging examples above, these transactions are not insurance
in any meaningful sense. Nothing about the speculation contract requires that it
be held for any period of time. An investor can buy or sell protection and hold it
for an hour, a day, a year, or five years (the typical maximum length), depending
on the profit that can be made from buying or selling at a particular time. The
contract does nothing more than offer an opportunity to buy or sell later at a
higher or lower price. In this way, credit derivatives can be, and are largely, about
investment, not insurance.38 In fact, they resemble secondary market
transactions in equities, since they involve market-based trades about the
fundamental value of a third party unrelated to the transaction in question.
A final (non-insurance) use of credit derivatives is arbitrage, of either the
pure or regulatory variety. Pure arbitrage possibilities arise when there is
temporary mispricing in markets that allows investors to engage in paired
transactions that earn sure profits, and thus eliminate the mispricing. Mispricing
in debt securities might arise because the primary and secondary markets are
traded on different markets: a firm’s bonds might be trading on a bond market,
while protection on those bonds might be trading on over-the-counter markets
that are not perfectly correlated with the public bond markets. This difference
might generate opportunities for an investor to buy/sell the underlying security
in one market, while simultaneously buying/selling protection on it in the overthe-counter market using a credit derivative in a way that allows it to earn a
return that is independent of the credit risk of the borrower. This kind of
arbitrage opportunity has no insurance-like characteristics, and it is potentially
quite useful in accurately pricing credit risk by removing temporary market
inefficiencies. Participants in credit derivative markets, at hedge funds, insurance
companies, and other large financial entities, describe this as a major driver of
their transactions in credit derivative markets.39
The other type of arbitrage—regulatory arbitrage—is related to insurance,
38 Life insurance could be used for investment in a way, but this is not its primary purpose or
the way it is typically used. Moreover, state insurance regulators are not really concerned about
regulating investment decisions by sophisticated parties.
39 Interview with executive at insurance company responsible for credit derivative
transactions, on March 21, 2009.
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since it is one of the main reasons insurance companies are involved in the credit
derivatives markets. But the lesson here runs counter to any regulatory story—in
fact, it is a product of regulation itself.
Regulatory arbitrage works like this. Banks are often the most efficient
originators of loans, since they have relationships with lenders and the back office
to underwrite and process loans, but they are not always the most efficient
holders of the loans because of regulations that make holding risk more costly for
them and regulations that make investing in credit risk difficult for insurance
companies and other risk-sensitive investors. In other words, smaller banks,
individual investors, insurance companies, pension funds, university
endowments, foreign governments, and a whole host of other investors would
like to participate in corporate debt markets, but cannot do so in the absence of
financial instruments that allow large commercial banks to sell the risk,
especially in ways, like securitization discussed above, that recharacterize the risk
in ways that make individual investments in it appear less risky. If insurance
companies, pension funds, or endowments can only invest in corporate debt
rated AAA, banks, who are required to hold cash reserves on corporate debt rated
below AAA will find a way of repackaging the debt so that some of the sub-AAA
debt can become AAA debt—this is the securitization and tranching process
described above.
The first set of regulations—capital adequacy rules in the Basel banking
accords—require banks to hold a certain amount of cash in reserve for each dollar
lent out. In short, banks have to hold cash other investors do not, which makes
them inefficient holders of risk. The reason for this rule is because banks have
average individuals as creditors through deposit taking, and given the moral
hazard problems created by federal deposit insurance, banks would otherwise
engage in socially inefficient risk taking. This cash, historically about 8 percent of
the total value at risk, is not productive from the standpoint of the bank’s
investors, so it would be more efficient for them to loan out the money, earn the
fees on the origination, and then offload the risk, in whole or part, to other
investors so that more of the bank’s cash can be put to use for its shareholders.
The reason insurance companies were involved heavily in these markets,
primarily as protection sellers to banks that had originated loans, is because state
law insurance regulations limiting the kinds of investments that insurance
companies can make. For instance, insurance companies are often restricted to
investing in credits rated AAA by credit rating agencies. These credit rating
agencies were in turn paid by the managers of credit derivative SPVs to rate the
risks of investments in those SPVs, often to get a slice of them to be rated AAA to
attract the monies held by insurance companies. As such, insurance companies
became one of the largest investors in credit derivatives. For example, AIG
(through its financial products business) invested nearly $400 billion in
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providing various European financial institutions with “regulatory capital relief”
through credit derivatives.
Credit derivatives help complete these markets by allowing the bank to
offload the risk to investors who can more efficiently bear it, while still having the
ability to earn fees from origination. A bank that makes a loan with a customer
can now package the credit risk of that loan in a new entity, which then uses
securitization to create risk slices that will be attractive to new classes of
investors, and then sells off interests in the new entity. To be sure, the original
bank could be thought of as buying insurance, since it is offloading to or sharing
risk with others. But that description of the activity is a cartoon representation of
the transaction. The bank is really engaging in regulatory arbitrage, but this
redefinition is only superficial. The important point is that looking at what the
bank is doing is only part of the story about whether regulation makes sense.
In addition, as discussed above, those buying interests in the bank’s credit
risk are no different than investors in any firm. A CDO is just a business plan in
which the proceeds from hundreds of credit risks from various lenders are pooled
together to generate a series of cash flows. The firm (or SPV) holding the interests
in these future cash flows is not conceptually different from a firm that sells
anything else, be it iPods, consulting services, or what have you, and then sells
interests in the cash flows these sales generate. When a firm raises money from
shareholders, it is buying insurance in the same way the bank that offloads some
risk through a credit derivative contract. Although equity holders are not liable to
make the seller of the risk whole in the event of some specific default, the equity
investors are providing the firm with an opportunity to reduce its risk. Equity,
like insurance, provides a cushion against a downturn. Of course, no one thinks
of regulating securities as insurance despite the similarity along this dimension.
There are at least two important differences between these two types of
risk-sharing mechanisms. First, on average the sellers of equity to regular firms
are much less sophisticated than the sellers of risk protection to lenders. This, of
course, cuts the other way from regulating credit derivatives as insurance.
Second, the structure of the standard insurance contract (and the typical credit
derivative contract) is different than the shareholder contract. Whereas in a
credit derivative or insurance contract the party assuming the risk receives
periodic payments in return for a promise to make the party selling the risk
whole, in the shareholder contract, the sequence of payments is reversed: the
party assuming the risk of default pays the money up front, while agreeing to
receive future cash flows in the form of dividends, capital appreciation, or
liquidation value in some time in the future. This alternative structure has
important implications, which are discussed below, but it does not necessarily
undermine the attempted analogy to insurance. After all, if insurance is defined
as a contract in which risk is moved from one party to the other, the structure and
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terms of the contract are, all else being equal, irrelevant to whether risk is in fact
being swapped.
The lesson to be learned from this use, which is also only superficially
similar to classic insurance, is that any regulation of insurance company
participation in credit derivative markets should focus on how insurance
companies invest in credit derivatives. This is especially true since insurance
companies are only a small fraction of the entire market in credit derivatives.
3. The Pooling Mismatch
Another reason insurance regulation is a bad fit for credit derivatives is
that there is a conceptual difference in the function of insurance and that of credit
derivatives. The premise of insurance is risk pooling. Insurance companies try to
spread or pool risk by attracting a sufficiently large number of diverse
policyholders such that the law of large numbers will reduce the aggregate
variance of claims. In this way, the total amount of risk can be shared by many
and thus reducing its impact on any individual in the pool. Counterparties to
derivative contracts do not usually do this.
In a single-name CDS contract, there are only two parties, so there is no
pooling of risk. When a hedge fund sells protection to bank, it does not act like an
insurance company that sells protection to an individual property owner. While
the insurance company puts together a diversified portfolio of property owners to
generate an actuarially predictable stream of liabilities, the hedge fund does not
do this. Hedge funds may try to offset the risk of a particular CDS with other
assets and liabilities in their portfolio, but they do not pool risk by writing
protection on hundreds or thousands of firms based on predictions about default
risk and correlation of risks. Or, to be more precise, they do not always and
necessarily do this. These counterparties may be hedging risks and trying to
reduce their overall risk exposure, but they are not doing so by pooling a lot of
independent risks. Accordingly the insurance component of the transaction looks
more like simple hedging, which is not regulated as insurance.
The lack of pooling is conceptual difference, but it may have a practical
consequence. Insurance regulation requires insurance companies to hold
significant capital reserves in part because if one insurance company fails, a lot of
beneficiaries will lose. (Importantly, many of these beneficiaries will be average
and unsophisticated citizens who are unable to bear the losses. This is the
consumer protection angle of insurance regulation discussed below.) The same
problem does not exist for credit derivatives generally, unless a single entity, like
AIG or Countrywide, made a lot of credit derivative bets (that do not cancel or net
out the risk of the sum) and the bets made are so large that it threatens the entity
and its policy holders or depositors. Note, however, that in the rare cases in
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which this did or is likely to happen, the independent regulation of the insurance
company or bank making the bets exists to ensure that the risks taken by the
entity are not excessive. In other words, if the problem is that an insurance
company, like AIG, took on excessive risks in credit derivative contracts, then the
rules about what investments insurance companies can make should be
reformed.
In more complicated credit derivative transactions, such as CDOs, there
are multiple parties, and arguably more risk pooling. As discussed above, in a
CDO, a new firm, an SPV, is created to sell protection to multiple lending banks,
and numerous investors own shares in the SPV. In this case, the analogy to
insurance pooling is more apt. One could view the multiple lending banks whose
notes are pooled together in the SPV as the policyholders, while the SPV and its
investors are the “insurance company.” While this analogy has more surficial
appeal than the case of plain-vanilla CDSs, as discussed below, the policy
arguments for insurance-like regulation do not obtain. So even in the case where
there is risk pooling—a necessary conceptual component of insurance—there is
no policy justification for insurance regulation. This is discussed below.
Even insurance commissioners admit that CDOs are not insurance for this
reason.40 There is a deep irony here. There is generally no risk pooling—an
essential component of “insurance”—in CDS contracts, but these are the contracts
that state insurance regulators and pundits consider insurance. In contrast, there
is at least some risk pooling in more complex CDO contracts, but there is often no
insurable interest in these transactions, so insurance regulators disavow any
regulatory oversight of them. The reason for the line drawn by insurance
regulators has to do with experience and thus expertise. Insurance regulators are
used to dealing with entities that pool risk, are responsible for ensuring an
adequate income stream to pay for future liabilities, and are contracting with
every-day consumers who rely on the insurance company to make them whole in
the event of large personal losses. This experience is not obviously transferable to
a market in which none of these things exist or are the key regulatory questions.
This is explored in greater detail below.
4. Limits on the Reach of Regulation
The artificial distinction drawn by regulators between plain-vanilla CDS
and more complicated credit derivative contracts points out a bigger problem
with any attempt to regulate credit derivatives using an insurance framework. If
(insurance) regulation is limited to cases where there is an insurable interest, the
contract is not one of simple hedging, arbitrage, or speculation, and there is risk
40

See infra note __ and surrounding text.

28 / Henderson
pooling, then this class of cases is like an empty set. If the set of regulated cases is
limited, as regulators assert, to cases in which there is privity, there is no risk
pooling. And, if the set of cases is limited to where there is risk pooling, there is
no privity, and thus the significant line-drawing problems discussed above arise.
More importantly from a welfare and efficiency perspective, however, is
that any regulation of one part of the market that does not cover the entire
market will simply redirect market activity to the unregulated market. Regulation
means additional costs, and investors will try to avoid these costs if they can do so
while achieving the same returns. The fact that credit derivative contracts are
simply ways of creating a specific risk-return profile means that the same riskreturn profile can be achieved in numerous ways that fall outside of any product
(as opposed to institution-based) regulation. For example, if new insurance
regulations cover only plain-vanilla CDS contracts, as proposed, investors can
replicate the returns they would have achieved with a single-name, real-interest
CDS by using a synthetic credit derivative contract that is, by the regulators
admission, unregulated. In a synthetic CDS contract, the parties do not actually
interact with the borrower or lender and do not use the underlying debt
instrument as anything more than a probability machine that determines future
payoffs between the parties. There is simply no difference between a real and a
synthetic CDS contract from the standpoint of these investors, and increased cost
on the former will simply mean more of the latter. This fact poses a significant
problem for regulators, since there are literally an infinite number of potential
contracts and contract forms that can be used by investors to share and transfer
credit risk.
Once one form of credit derivative is regulated, other forms will sprout up
that will match exactly the same risk-return profile but that will be unregulated
for one reason or another. As discussed below, a more sensible regulatory
approach is to identify investors who are likely to make bad investment decisions
on average for one reason or another, and ban them from particular forms of
investment, require them to receive special disclosures or protections, or other
parternalistic regulation. Lack of sophistication, for instance, provides a central
justification for securities regulation, while market failures that may arise out of
governance concerns provides the justification for insurance regulation. Both of
these, however, are focused largely on the impact on particular investors, as
opposed to the nature of the products being sold.
There is a case where synthetic derivative contracts may be used to reduce
real risk, and therefore more insurance like. If the original lending bank enters
into a synthetic contract to hedge its risk, it is the same as if the bank enters into
a standard credit derivative contract with a protection seller, since the bank is
reducing its risk of loss on the default of the original debt. The bank in both cases
is seeking regulatory relief from its capital adequacy requirements. But although
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this type of contract resembles a case where there is an insurable interest more
closely, the party on the other side, that is the one betting that the borrower will
repay the loan, may not know that it is providing insurance of a sort, and even if
it did, it would still make more sense to regulate this contract as a matter of
banking law. After all, the bank is engaging in regulatory arbitrage, which may be
normatively good or bad from the perspective of banking policy. Banks hedging
risk reduces the probability that they will default, and thus jeopardize the claims
of depositors. On the other hand, it is possible that some banks used credit
derivative contracts not to hedge risks but to increase profits by repackaging
loans, moving them off of the bank’s balance sheet, receiving regulatory relief,
and then bringing the risk back onto the bank’s balance sheet through
mechanisms that were not transparent to regulators. Again, these issues are
largely about banking law—that is, capital adequacy requirements, rules about
relief from these requirements, banking oversight, compensation of bank
executives, and so on.
5. Moral Hazard Problems and Solutions
One argument in favor of insurance regulation for credit derivatives is
based on the fact that both insurance and credit derivative contracts are subject
to moral hazard concerns. But the mere existence of moral hazard problems does
not justify insurance regulation per se. Moral hazard arises in many contracts and
situations that are not deemed insurance. In addition, there are alternative ways
of reducing moral hazard short of full insurance regulation. For instance,
regulation by other agencies or leaving the problems to be worked out by the
parties acting collectively through trade associations. As it turns out, contractual
innovation and self-regulatory norms are already being deployed by the
International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) to remedy some of the moral
hazard problems inherent in credit derivative markets. As discussed below, there
remain some market failures, but none of them are especially redressable by
insurance regulation alone.
Moral hazard problems arise whenever any risk is intermediated. Just as
one is less likely to take care while driving if one has good insurance (especially
with a low deductible), so too is a bank less likely to do the efficient level of due
diligence or otherwise monitor a borrower if it is going to sell the risk to someone
else (and not retain a first-loss position). In equilibrium, investors in the
borrowers’ credit risk have an incentive to price this potential shirking, and
therefore the arrangers of the SPV would have an incentive to choose the credit
risks to put in it wisely, lest they be required to offer greater returns to investors.
In a frictionless world, in other words, the amount of due diligence would be
priced by the market. The credit crunch revealed significant mispricing in credit
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markets, but nothing that calls this equilibrium solution into doubt. With
learning from the recent collapse, it is likely that this discipline will return to the
market.
Even if it does not, there is not much that insurance regulation is likely to
add to solve the problem. No regulators or private actors were aware of the
mispricing problem, despite the fact that there were numerous regulators,
including insurance regulators (AIG is an insurance company after all!),
monitoring these markets closely, and despite the fact that investors were betting
billions of dollars of their own money on these instruments. To simply declare
that more regulation, and in particular more insurance regulation, is needed, is to
simply declare the debate over.
Another type of moral hazard is the potential that the parties to credit
derivative contracts might act in ways that destroy social value but increase the
private value to the party. For instance, a buyer of protection, like a bank, might
have incentives to force a borrower to default on a debt in order to collect on the
credit derivative contract, even if it is not otherwise efficient for it to do so. This
problem arises only because there may be technical defaults that would otherwise
not lead to bankruptcy but that bank could insist upon enforcing covenants
against them now that its downside is limited by its purchase of protection. (The
analogy to insurance here is that the buyer of insurance might willingly destroy
an otherwise valuable asset to collect on an insurance premium in cases in which
the asset has value but this value is less than the value of the insurance policy.)
While this is possible, there are at least three things that limit its practical effect.
The first of these is the fact that private contracts take this problem into
account, without the need for regulatory mandate. This is not to say that there are
not market failures, but simply that this particular problem is not unknown or
unremedied in credit derivative markets. As in insurance, where the problem
exists too, buyers of protection voluntarily reduce the risk they will shirk because
of the moral hazard problem by agreeing to bear some of the first losses that may
arise from a default by the original borrower. In insurance, this is called a
deductible, and the theory is that it reduces on the margin the incentive of the
insured to engage in socially destructive behavior. Credit derivative contracts try
to reduce this conduct too—the buyers of credit derivative protection routinely
hold the first-loss position so as to signal to sellers of protection that the bank
buying protection has some skin the game and will not engage in this kind of
destructive behavior. A deductible, being less than 100 percent of the risk,
however, can never fully offset this risk, so there remains some moral hazard
problem. Part of this can be priced by the market, but industry norms can try to
reduce it too. This is the next solution.
The second way moral hazard is reduced is through the fact that selfregulatory bodies, like the ISDA, are already aware of this possibility and are
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structuring industry norms and boilerplate contracts to mitigate these potential
problems. The moral hazard issue arose for the first time in the case of credit
derivative contracts written on the financial services and insurance firm Conseco.
Credit derivative contracts at that time required a payment from the seller to the
buyer of protection in the event that the underlying reference entity—in this case,
Conseco—suffered a “credit event,” which included a restructuring of the
reference entity’s bank loans. In 2000, Conseco’s credit quality deteriorated and
began to suffer liquidity problems, so it went to its borrowers in search of a
restructuring agreement. The lenders agreed, including an extension of maturity,
increased interest rates, and new covenants. The restructuring triggered payment
under the existing credit derivative contracts.
This fact created a serious moral hazard problem. The original lenders to
Conseco, who had purchased protection against a credit event, were the ones who
got to decide whether to restructure Conseco’s debt, and thus whether a
restructuring event transpired.41 The lenders could trigger payment simply by
agreeing to extend the maturity of the loan or make other trivial changes to the
loan that would cost them little (and would be readily agreed to by the borrower)
and yet trigger potentially large payments from the sellers of protection. In fact,
the situation under the then-prevailing boilerplate terms was much worse than
that. Under the ISDA’s 1999 version of the boilerplate terms (called the
“Definitions”), the buyers of protection could deliver any debt instrument of the
same kind as that on which the lender or other party bought protection. Since
Conseco had a number of outstanding debt instruments of varying maturity, the
bank triggering a restructuring credit event could choose the cheapest of these
outstanding debt instruments, thereby making large profits on its self-triggering
claim. Specifically, Conseco had short-term bonds that were trading at about 90
percent of face value, while its long-term bonds were trading at about 60 percent
of face value. This meant the original lender could declare default, and then buy
long-term bonds at 60 cents to settle out its much more expensive short-term
bonds. This exposed the sellers of protection to large losses. The same result
obtained in the restructuring of Xerox Corporation in 2002.42
There were two reactions to the moral hazard issues raised by the Conseco
and Xerox cases, both private. The market price of credit derivative contracts
quickly adjusted to account for the increased risk of contracts including
restructuring events as credit events. The contracts “including restructuring as a
credit event was 10 to 20 [basis points per year] higher than for credit default

41 SATYAJIT DAS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: CDOS AND STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS 101-103 (3rd
ed. 2005).
42 See Viktor Hjort, “The Xerox Debt Restructuring – A Moral Hazard Issue?” Morgan
Stanley, Fixed Income Research (July 19, 2002).
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swaps without the restructuring credit event.”43
The other reaction was a modification of the boilerplate credit default
swap documentation by ISDA. One possibility was that ISDA could simply
eliminate restructuring as a credit event, but this was foreclosed by a decision of
the Federal Reserve that protection from the risk of restructuring was essential to
the transfer of credit risk essential to receiving regulatory relief under the Basel
accords.44 ISDA therefore issued a “Restructuring Supplement” that provided
restructuring would not be a credit event in cases where there were fewer than
four holders of the debt in question or where less than a super-majority of
unaffiliated holders approved the restructuring.45 In addition, the amendments to
the boilerplate tried to reduce the potential arbitrage inherent in delivery options
for debts with different maturities by requiring any settlement of credit derivative
contracts to be made with debt contracts within 30 months of the restructured
facility. Further changes to the boilerplate were made in 2003 to address market
developments.46 The idea with these changes was to reduce the moral hazard
problems by contract.
The third non-regulatory way moral hazard is reduced is the presence of
countervailing interests on the other side of the transaction that generate
behaviors that may cancel out any possibility of abuse. Just as the buyer of
protection has incentives to act in a socially inefficient way by destroying value to
cash in on a credit-derivative contract, the seller of protection has incentives to
act in exactly the opposite way. More specifically, if the original lender that
bought protection refuses to make a loan that would increase the value of the
debtor in order to cash in on a credit protection contract, the hedge fund that sold
protection has the incentive to make the loan so not to have pay on the contract.
These offsetting incentives only work under two conditions: both parties have
sufficient access to capital to provide the loans necessary, and there is relatively
symmetric incentives to act, otherwise there may be a socially inefficient level of
lending (either too much or too little). Even if the other party to the transaction
does not act to deliberately counteract the action, it will be well positioned to
detect it and report any misconduct to the market (to impose reputational
penalties) or the government (to impose civil or perhaps criminal penalties). (As
a side note, insofar as antitrust-based uncertainties preclude collective action on
the part of numerous sellers of protection, these rules should be rethought in this
light.)
DAS, STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS, at 103.
See William Rhode, “Fed Says No To Credit Restructuring,” Derivatives Strategy 6 (Dec.
2000).
45 See Restructuring Supplement to the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, ISDA
(2001); see also, Donald A. Bendernagel & Oussama Nasr, “Legal Documentation and the
Restructuring Debate,” Credit Derivatives Issues and Opportunities 21-26 (2001).
46 DAS, STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS, at 105.
43

44

Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance” / 33
The more generic version of this moral hazard concern is the risk of
sabotage. Individuals and entities that are not insurance companies (meaning:
not regulated by insurance law) are not permitted to write certain insurance
contracts, say, on an individual’s life, out of concern that one of the parties will
try to sabotage the contract. Or, to look at another way, where there is no
symmetry or where the attack and defense would simply result in an arm’s race of
dead weight costs, the risk created by insurance contracts outweighs any gains.
This is especially true when the value of the asset that is the subject of the
contract is particularly valuable or difficult to value.
Although this logic might make sense for individuals and contracts like life
insurance, the risk of sabotage is overstated in the world of credit derivatives.
First, in this $60 trillion industry, there has never been a reported case of one
party to a contract acted to deliberately sabotage an underlying borrower in order
to cash in on a credit derivative contract. Second, the gains from sabotage are as
great or greater in equity markets, currency markets, and a whole host of other
markets where third parties are able to make large bets on economic outcomes.
For instance, a malicious investor could take a large short position in Firm X, and
then destroy an asset of Firm X, say by not loaning it money, blowing it up,
spreading rumors about it, or any number of activities. This risk is real, but it is
uncommon because other laws (for example, criminal law, tort law, and securities
laws banning market manipulation) and norms restrain individuals from making
socially destructive (but privately beneficial) decisions. Although market
participants, observers, and regulators should always keep a look out for the
possibility of sabotage, since reporting it to the market and prosecutors is likely
to provide sufficient deterrence.
***
As this section has showed, regulators are likely to find it very difficult to
draw sensible lines or regulate financial products in a coherent and efficient
manner under the rubric of insurance regulation. This means that regulation
might more sensibly focus on investors instead of investments. Insurance law is
based less on regulating insurance than on regulating insurance companies. In
other words, we do not regulate insurance companies because they sell insurance,
but rather regulate insurance contracts because they are sold by insurance
companies. The right question to ask is not whether credit derivatives are
“insurance,” but rather if they are sold or issued by “insurance companies.” This,
of course, begs the question of what should count as an insurance company.
The next Part tries to answer this question by looking at the policy reasons
for having a separate body of insurance law to regulate insurance companies. The
policy reasons are uniquely applicable to insurance companies, not all firms that
participate in credit derivative markets, and thus there is no good policy reason
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for applying insurance regulation.
B. The Policy Reasons for Insurance Law Do Not Obtain
Given the problems of defining what “insurance” is, it must be the case
that the scope of insurance law is either quite arbitrary or based on other
considerations. In fact, insurance regulation exists not to regulate insurance
contracts per se, but rather to regulate contracts issued by insurance companies.
For sophisticated or semi-sophisticate parties, the insurance companies are the
problem, not the insurance.47 Insurance companies are regulated differently than
companies producing other products because of the unique governance problems
associated with their production cycle and unique governance structure. Let us
consider these in turn.
1. Inverted Production Cycle
The first unique feature of insurance companies is the fact that they sell
their products long before they are delivered to customers. This means the
normal production cycle is inverted. The typical (that is, non-insurance) firm
produces products and then sells them in return for cash. Payment and delivery
are linked closely in time and there is an immediate feedback from customers.
Insurance companies, however, have a much different production cycle that
causes unique governance problems. An insurance company’s customers are
policyholders, who pay (in the form of premium payments) in advance for
products (payments on claims) that come many years later, if at all.48 This is
important because the discipline on how cash can be spent that comes with
having to sell valuable products or services in the market is missing or
attenuated. Payments are made based on promises alone, and there is thus the
risk that the cash reverses given in advance to the insurance company will be
squandered on risky investments, and thus unavailable to pay off claims when
they come due. This is the Ponzi-scheme problem discussed above. When there is
continuous solicitation of investment by outsiders and a mismatched payment
scheme (current investments pay liabilities of previous investors), there is a risk
that managers will engage in too much risk when the liabilities that arise are
greater than predicted. In these bad states of the world, insurance company
managers have incentives to attract more capital on irrational terms to pay
current liabilities owed to prior investors.
The inverted production cycle of insurance companies has another
47 There is another justification for insurance regulation that has to do with the consumerfacing nature of some insurance contracts. This is discussed below.
48 The payout for life insurance policies may obviously be decades away.
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problem where there are competitive markets for insurance services. In an
unregulated market, insurance companies are bound to compete heavily on price,
and this may lead to under reserves such that future liabilities will not be covered
by sufficient assets. There are two parts of this claim, so it is worth unpacking it.
First, competition among insurance companies is likely to focus mostly,
and perhaps excessively, on price. This is because the quality of the products
insurance companies are selling (the other thing on which they compete) is
identical or unobservable. The repayment of losses less the deductible is the same
regardless of the insurer. There is some risk that the insurer will fail and be
unable to repay the liabilities, but this is something that is, by its very nature,
unobservable by the insureds. Reputation and longevity may be correlated with
this risk, but these factors coupled with the governance problems noted above
may simply lead to more risky investment choices by the insurer in the next
period. Another unobservable component of potential competition is service
quality—that is, the timeliness of payments, the cost of the claims process, the
quality of customer service, and so on. Like the risk of default, these will be
unobservable by the insureds in the period when they make their investment
decision, since they happen only many years later and after premiums have
already been collected. For these reasons, price is likely the primary way in which
insurance companies would compete in an unregulated market.
Second, price competition for insurance products is different from price
competition for non-insurance products, and, if unregulated, may lead to pricing
at below marginal cost. Non-insurance firms have no incentive to price below
marginal cost, since every sale would then lose the firm money. Insurance
companies, however, have inverted production cycles, which means the costs of
the product being sold are felt long after the cash is collected by the firm for the
sale. This means myopic managers, hubristic managers, over-confident
managers, or desperate managers may charge too little for new insurance
premiums. Insurance involves lots of long-range forecasting and the potential for
costs, which are realized only after sales, to be much higher than expected.
Absent the immediate feedback loop of typical production cycles, the possibility
of competition leading to destructive price wars is greater than for normal firms.
It is true that credit derivative contracts are somewhat based on future
results and forecasting problems may arise. But this is concern is ameliorated by
several factors. Credit derivative contracts are generally much shorter term than
insurance contracts, lasting a maximum of five years, and very often held for
much shorter than that. So although make-whole payments under the contract
may occur in the future, the potential for error is reduced by the fact that
forecasting need be made over a much shorter period. The risk is also priced
much more frequently, since payments made by protection buyers are due
quarterly. For most credit derivative contracts, the prices of buying and selling
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production are adjusted quarterly depending on the financial condition of the
underlying borrower, and this generates the kind of frequent pricing data that is
common in regular product markets. Even where it is not, the continuous pricing
of the same debt in the market allows holders of risk to engage in pairwise
transactions that allow them to rebalance their portfolio on short time horizons.
In addition, the parties on both sides are highly sophisticated financial
institutions (and their investors), and it is unlikely that any outsider, like a
regulator, could do a better job at estimating the future cash flows from particular
debt instruments so as to improve pricing.
The pricing problem for insurance companies is exacerbated by the weak
governance structure described below, which may encourage overly risky actions
when policy payouts exceed expectations. In short, the managers of an insurance
firm that charges too little, for whatever reason, and finds itself unable to meet
claims as they come due, may be less constrained by creditors in the kind of
response it will take. The managers may simply try to sell more policies to pay off
existing claims from other policyholders with the hope of someday righting the
ship. This potential that arises from price competition may turn an insurance
company into a sort of Ponzi scheme.
This super risk preference situation is unlikely to arise in the case of noninsurance firms because of the discipline of product markets and because of the
discipline of creditors when times are bad. For credit derivative firms (that is,
SPVs holding the rights to the cash flows from various debt instruments), the
probability of this arising is even lower. This is because investment by the SPV
managers happens before any investment is made by shareholders in the SPV. A
pot of cash is created and then sold, with an implicit promise that no more assets
will be added that that particular pot. The possibility of super risk preferring
managers is thus extremely unlikely.
2. Weak Governance Structure
The second unique feature of insurance companies is the weak corporate
governance structure that is inherent in the insurance company model. Noninsurance firms are generally funded by a large number of diffuse shareholders
and a small number of concentrated creditors, typically banks or other lenders. In
this governance model, the shareholders are the residual claimants of firm value,
and in good times it is in their interest that the managers operate the firm.49 The
diffuse nature of the holdings of equity, coupled with the business judgment rule,
mean firms have a lot of slack in the risk they take during good times. When
things turn for the worse, however, the interests of the shareholders are set aside
49

Assuming, of course, the managers aren’t acting in their own interest.
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and the concentrated interests of banks and other lenders take over the decisionmaking process.50 Loan covenants are enforced, contracts are rewritten by the
lenders, managers are replaced, and a restructuring of the firm is undertaken.
The reason creditors take effective control long before bankruptcy is because in
the absence of these control rights, shareholders (and their agents, the managers)
would have incentives to act ever more risky as the value of shares drops.
Consolidated creditors can help preserve going concern value and reduce
dangerous risk taking in near final periods. (It is, of course, irrelevant whether
this concentration of creditors takes place when debt is issued (when times are
good) or when it is consolidated (when times are bad), since concentration is less
likely in insurance companies in either case because the creditors of the firm are
its policy holders.)
Unlike non-insurance firms (but like banks), insurance firms are
structured with both weak equity holders and weak creditors. Insurance firms
(and banks) have shareholders that are indistinguishable from other firms, but
their creditors are as diffuse and disinterested as their shareholders. An
insurance company’s creditors are its policyholders. Their large number makes
coordination difficult, either for monitoring or action, and information costly and
very unlikely to be obtained. In addition, policy holders are not investors (like
many shareholders are), and therefore likely to be unaware of and
unsophisticated about matters of corporate governance and finance. And unlike
diffuse creditors of non-insurance firms (e.g., bondholders), the claims of
policyholders cannot be and are not consolidated or concentrated in periods of
distress. This means an increased threat of excessively risky decision making in
bad times because the insurance company's creditors are diffuse instead of
concentrated. Both in insurance and banking, where depositors are substituted
for policy holders, this suggests the need for a prudential regulator to effectively
consolidate the diffuse policyholders into a bank-like consolidated creditor to
deal with the insurance company in bad times.
This governance problem is not present consistently, if ever, in credit
derivative transactions. To see this, consider the simplest case of a plain-vanilla
CDS. Remembering the analogy with insurance set forth above, the bank that lent
the money to the borrower is the insured, and thus analogous to the policyholder
in an insurance contract. In a single-name CDS contract, there is no pooling and
therefore no diffusion of interest among the alleged insurer’s “policy holders.” In
addition, banks that buy credit protection are nothing like individuals that buy
auto or life insurance policies. Banks are sophisticated, repeat players,
represented by counsel, capable of processing information about the riskiness of
their counterparty, and have tremendous bargaining power.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever
of Corporate Governance, 154 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 1209 (2006).
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It is possible for a protection seller to write many CDS contracts, and thus
put any individual buyer of credit protection into the position of holding a small
claim against the firm, say insurance company or hedge fund. Although this
would not change the nature of the protection buyer and the ability of it to fend
for itself, it does raise potential concerns about the management of the protection
seller. But this just then puts the inquiry about governance back at that level, and
tied to the nature of the seller of protection. If the protection seller has a weak
governance model, like that of a bank or an insurance company, then it may be
susceptible to this problem, but if it is an entity with strong governance in bad
times, then the concern about too much risk on the part of managers (on behalf
of shareholders) is much lower. Hedge funds, for instance, must return to the
market frequently for capital (that is, they do not have capital lock in) and are
funded by extremely sophisticated investors. They are decidedly not subject to
this concern. In short, insurance companies, with weak governance, should be
subject to regulation to avoid the social inefficiency that might arise from their
governance structure, while non-insurance companies, with strong governance,
are less worrisome.
The same result obtains even when we consider a more complicated credit
derivative contract. The parties buying protection that have their default risk
pooled into a CDO structure are large financial entities with much greater
sophistication and risk-bearing ability than individuals buying typical insurance
products. The risk that the sellers of protection will “pull a fast one” on them is
much lower given this sophistication. In addition, the investors in the SPV
holding the default risk (the analogous insurance company) are likewise large
financial entities capable of making risk assessments, demanding and processing
information, pricing risk, and wielding their bargaining power in the event a bad
future state arises.
Moreover, the nature of the typical CDO structure is effectively a one-time
game, in which credit risks are pooled and the cash flows sold off to investors.
The sponsor and manager of the SPV does not continue to sell protection based
on a pool of funds provided by investors (as in an insurance company), but rather
makes the investments first (by choosing risks to pool), then goes to the market
to sell cash flow rights to investors. This means that managers of the SPV do not
really do much or can do much in terms of risk alteration of the SPV once it has
raised money from investors. The future course of the SPV is set, and the payouts
are what they are. No future investments are made, no additional investors are
brought in, and there can be no change in strategy for the firm. Therefore, there
is less chance for abuse in the event the SPV payouts are less than expected.
Governance quality is largely irrelevant in this model firm.
Applying this governance model to the insurance company model, it is as if
the insurance company wrote all of its policies before raising money in the
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market. In that case, investors would worry less about the governance of the
insurance company, since its job would simply be to process claims from the
policies it had written—it would not take on new policies (and a new source of
cash) on terms likely to be unfavorable to existing investors. There would still be
some governance risk, however, since the decisions on what policies to pay out
on, how much to compensate executives, and other firm costs still have to be
made. In some of these, managerial interests may be aligned with those of
investors, while in others they may diverge. Importantly, however, this residual
governance risk is not present in the CDO case, since all of these decisions are
made before the investment in the firm (for example, management fees) or are
automated (for example, the amount of payouts). In short, any governance
problems simply do not obtain in the typical structure of credit derivative
contracts.
3. Consumer Protection
The third policy reason for a separate body of insurance law is the need for
strong consumer protection. While the concern with the inverted-productioncycle and governance problems was basically insurance firms not charging
insureds enough, the consumer protection concern is that insurance firms will
charge too much. As mentioned above, the concern is based on the following
syllogism: insurance is a critical product for most individuals; individuals are not
sophisticated about insurance products or contracts; and therefore insurance
companies will take advantage of customers by overcharging them. Accordingly,
(the bulk of) state insurance law regulates the substance and terms of insurance
policies (to make them simpler to understand and compare across firms), as well
as regulating service and coverage issues (to make sure insurance firms do not
back away from promises to pay). In other words, insurance is sometimes
regulated as a specialty consumer product in which informational and bargaining
power asymmetries are sufficiently large that social losses may be generated from
an unregulated market.
The credit derivatives market described above has none of these
characteristics or concerns. The parties to credit derivative transactions are all
large financial institutions or other sophisticated investors with access to
information, the ability to understand and process the information, bargaining
power, and the ability to bear losses. This is in sharp contrast with insurance
contracts entered into by average consumers, who have none of these attributes.
It may be sensible for insurance regulators to try to reduce informational and
bargaining power asymmetries between insurance companies and consumers, to
provide oversight of claims management and customer service, to provide
standardized contract terms that allow comparison shopping, and to even
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regulate rates, but these policies are unnecessary where the buyers and sellers of
“insurance” are large financial institutions. In fact, if anything, the sellers of
protection (the alleged insurance companies) may often be less sophisticated
than the buyers of protection (the alleged insureds). For example, a small hedge
fund run by a few investors may enter into a contract to sell protection to a large
commercial bank. In this case, it is not at all clear where insurance-law-like
consumer protection duties should run. After all, existing law will treat both the
hedge fund and the bank as not needing the protection of the securities laws or
other regulations.
In addition, as discussed above, standard-setting groups, like the
International Swap Dealers Association, are already doing much of the work for
credit derivative markets that insurance regulators do to protect average
consumers. ISDA provides, among other things, standard form contracts (which
innovate to respond to changes in the market), dispute resolution mechanisms
and guidance, information, educational services, and so on.
C. Insurance Law Doesn’t Work Well and Won’t Uniquely Add Much
A final argument against treating credit derivative contracts as insurance
is a practical one having to do with the value that insurance regulation, as
currently constituted, might add to the market. In short, insurance law and its
generation and enforcement regime is generally considered to be inefficient and
in need of dramatic reforms, and is therefore not the most appropriate locus of
authority for a regulation of a new financial innovation that spans numerous
types of institutions and serves innumerable purposes, most of which have
nothing to do with insuring against risk as it is commonly understood.
1. Jurisdictional Issues
As discussed above, insurance regulation is state based, meaning there are
at least fifty different regulators and models of regulation. The state-based model
is largely premised on the consumer-protection function of insurance regulation,
since it is the state police power to protect citizens from abuse that justifies a
local approach. While the merits of this model are debatable when it comes to
providing efficient insurance services for health care or automobile risk, the
global nature of modern financial markets makes the local argument much more
difficult to make for credit derivatives. Do citizens of New Jersey need different
protection in credit derivative markets than citizens of New York? In fact,
insurance companies seemed to exploit this regulatory fracture by dividing up
their businesses into discrete components that were regulated piecemeal by
various state regulators. Given the ease of capital flows, the ability of firms to
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incorporate anywhere around the globe, and the fact that even transactions in the
Cayman Islands can impact investors around the world, the idea of insurance
regulators in a particular state controlling the global market seems fanciful. New
York regulators, for instance, had authority over less than 10 percent of AIG’s
operations, because of the corporate structure of AIG.51 As a result, one of world’s
biggest insurers was, under the current system, able to be largely below the radar
screen of its primary insurance regulators. Applying this dysfunctional model,
and again, one based primarily on consumer issues, which are the least applicable
to this market, to new financial products makes little sense.
The choice of regulator, be it a question of a particular entity or a general
jurisdictional choice (like federal or state), is based on regulatory expertise,
incentives, and the expected consequences of the regulatory model on the ability
to minimize the decision costs and error costs of regulation. State-based
regulation might make sense if jurisdictional competition is likely to lead to the
efficient regulation (that is, the race-to-the-top theory of state-based corporate
law). But this is not the basis for state-based insurance law. State insurance law is
not based solely on the state of incorporation of the insurance company, but
rather the locus of policy holders. In any event, this model will probably not work
for a market like credit derivatives. Financial markets are generally regulated by
federal agencies (or perhaps in the future by international ones) because financial
products are sold in a global market, and any state-based regime could be
avoided by simply opting into offshore regulatory regimes. If the goal of
regulation is to encourage credit derivatives to be traded on exchanges as
opposed to in over-the-counter markets, as argued below, having a single
regulator to choose from is crucial to creating commodifiable products. If credit
derivative-holding SPVs could opt into one set of regulations through choice, this
might provide some federalism-esque benefits, but this is not the way insurance
law operates.
Another factor influencing the choice of regulator is expertise. Here too,
there is nothing about state insurance regulators that seems special or unique.
State insurance regulators are used to dealing with insurance companies and
insurance contracts, which, as described above, deal with issues of risk pooling,
governance problems, consumer-facing contract issues, and the like. None of
these obtain in credit derivative markets. Insurance commissioners are also
generally concerned with counterparty risk—a real concern in credit derivative
markets—but this is something bank regulators (like the FDIC, Federal Reserve,
and Treasury), derivative regulators (like the CFTC), and securities regulators
(like the SEC) are also especially concerned with. In addition, these latter
regulators do not have the state overlap problem described above.
See This American Life Episode Transcript Program #382, “The Watchmen,” available at
http://www.thislife.org/extras/radio/382_transcript.pdf.
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2. Substantive Law
Deeming credit derivatives to be “insurance” (or credit protection sellers
“insurance companies”) would, under current law, have several consequences,
none of which is likely to improve the efficiency of credit derivative markets.
i.

Licensing

First, entities could not sell protection unless the seller was a licensed
insurance company. All fifty states require a state-issued license before a firm
may issue an insurance policy.52 Such a pre-screening requirement might make
some sense as part of trading on a credit derivatives exchange, say by requiring
those buying or selling on the exchange to meet certain criteria, like margin
requirements. But certifications based on other factors unrelated to the
exchange’s risk of default would add costs without any offsetting benefits, and
would merely open up the possibility that regulators could extract rents from
firms wanting to participate in these markets. As discussed below in the context
of capital requirements, the licensing scheme for insurance companies is doable
in part because there are only a handful of firms providing insurance in each
state. In contrast, there are literally tens of thousands of investment funds that
have sold or could sell credit protection in credit derivative markets, and this
would make any licensing scheme prohibitive or meaningless for state regulators.
It would also impose potentially large costs on funds who do not sell protection as
a normal part of their investment strategy, but might find it efficient and sensible
to do so in limited cases. Regulatory costs would therefore deter these funds from
participating in the market, without any proof that the funds have imposed any
costs on others.
ii.

Duties

Second, the buyer and seller of protection would be subject to a duty to act
with the utmost good faith, that is, something beyond the “morals of the
marketplace.” This might make some sense for markets in which buyers and
sellers are of widely differing sophistication, have access to different information,
and have different bargaining power, but it makes much less sense when the
parties on both sides of a transaction are similar giant financial institutions. In
fact, the trend in the market is for large investors to opt out of these kinds of
52 See, for example N.Y. Ins. L. § 1102(a) “Insurer's license required; issuance. (a) No person,
firm, association, corporation or joint-stock company shall do an insurance business in this state
unless authorized by a license in force pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, or exempted by
the provisions of this chapter from such requirement.”
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disclosure requirements and the like using waivers known as “Big Boy” letters. To
impose fiduciary duties or other litigation-generating obligations on parties
without the potential for opt out will increase uncertainty and costs without any
obvious benefit from ex post judicial determinations of what were and were not
good deals.
iii.
Capital reserves
Third, protection sellers would be required to maintain a certain amount
of capital based on the risk inherent in its “insurance-based” business.53 For
instance, state insurance regulation requires every insurer to maintain certain
specified amounts of capital on hand to reduce counterparty risk and to submit
its risk-based capital levels to regulators on an annual basis.54 The amounts of
capital required vary by jurisdiction and entity, depending on the riskiness of the
insurance company.55
In the abstract, capital reserves are unobjectionable, since they are about
reducing counterparty risk, and therefore about increasing the number of socially
beneficial transactions. After all, these requirements are a common element of
banking law and other areas where counterparty risk and the problem of runs
and systemic risk are present. The question is then how much capital should be
required, what is the best way to reduce counterparty risk, and which regulator
has the incentive to figure these things out. There are several reasons why
insurance regulators are not obviously the best candidate to fulfill this mission,
and why the solution of requiring credit derivatives to be exchange-traded is a
more elegant solution, albeit one fraught with problems too.
There are several problems with insurance regulators imposing this
requirement on the credit derivative markets. For one, the number of entities and
individuals writing protection on indebtedness is enormous, making any prescreening regulation extremely costly. For example, there are over 15,000 hedge
funds in the United States alone, each of which could be a participant in these
markets.56 The magnitude and complexity of the job of simply tracking each of
See, for example, N.Y. Ins. L. §§ 1322 and 1324.
See, for example, N.Y. Ins. L. § 1402 “Minimum capital or minimum surplus to
policyholder investments. (a) Before investing its funds in any other investments, every domestic
insurer shall invest and maintain an amount equal to the greater of the minimum capital required
by law or the minimum surplus to policyholders required to be maintained by law for a domestic
stock corporation authorized to transact the same kinds of insurance, only in investments of the
types specified in this section which are not in default as to principal or interest.”
55 The Model Insurance Act, for instance, provides for three “risk-based capital” levels: (i)
mandatory control level risk-based capital (measured at .7 times authorized control level riskbased capital), (ii) regulatory action level risk-based capital (measured at 1.5 times authorized
control level risk-based capital), and (iii) company action level risk-based capital (measured at 2.0
times authorized control
level risk-based capital).
56 See http://www.thetradenews.com/hedge-funds/prime-brokerage/613.
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these hedge funds—only one type of protection seller—would be beyond the
capacity of any existing state regulators. The job would be made even more
overwhelming since selling protection is not necessarily a full-time job. Hedge
funds and other sellers may hold the default risk for a very short time (a few
months or less) and may engage in transactions only periodically or on a one-off
basis. Unlike insurance companies that exist to provide risk sharing services,
protection sellers are not necessarily in the business of holding debt risk. The
fluid nature of market participants would make any licensing or ex-ante
regulatory regime incredibly costly and drive many participants out of the
market.
In addition, capital requirements did not work well if at all in preventing
insurance companies, such as AIG, from investing aggressively and, as it turns
out, dangerously in credit derivative markets. The state-based model was
manipulated by AIG and others, and this possibility could only be expected to be
worse if every credit derivative protection seller becomes a ward of insurance
regulators. In other words, the job of regulation would get much more difficult
without any obvious way of increasing the capabilities of regulators. This point is
made even more clear by reiterating the point made above about how insurance
regulators are not experts in financial markets in which most protection sellers
participate. If insurance companies can avoid insurance regulation, it is very
likely that hedge funds and other sophisticated and fast-moving private money
funds will be able to do so too.
Moreover, capital adequacy requirements imposed by regulators (as
opposed to margin requirements required by exchanges) generated the incentive
for regulatory arbitrage described above. Firms subjected to these requirements
had incentives to hold higher quality debt risk, which received lower capital
charges, and to move debt risk off of their balance sheets and into bankruptcyremote SPVs. Although this type of arbitrage is likely inevitable at some level, the
current regulatory model for insurance proved ineffectual at preventing arbitrage
that imposed systemic risk externalities on society.
Finally, insurance regulators are not experts about the amount, type, and
structuring of capital requirements to reduce counterparty risk in non-insurance
financial transactions. It is arguable that insurance regulators, representing the
state, have incentives to determine the amount of social cost from the failure of
an insurance company, since many of the social harms that would result would be
paid for by a state-funded social safety net or would otherwise result in statebased harms. But the failure of a hedge fund or foreign bank or other protection
seller may generate no social losses, because gains from bets on one side cancel
out losses from bets on the other side, or are ones that are not clearly within the
purview or concern of state regulators. Systemic risk is something not felt
completely or even directly by one state, and therefore a collective action problem
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may generate insufficient incentives to get the regulation to the efficient level.
It is important to note that, as proposed below, trading credit derivatives
on an exchange would likely require some financial assurances akin to capital
adequacy requirements on market participants, through margin requirements,
and on the exchange, which would be the ultimate bearer of counterparty risk.
For the reasons discussed below, the concerns here are much less than through
regulatory capital reserve requirements. For one, exchanges, which act as a
centralized counterparty, bear the entire risk of loss if a trading party defaults,
and therefore have the best incentives in terms of setting up rules to ensure that
traders are likely to pay for their losses.
iv.

Disclosure

Fourth, being an insurance company would trigger a detailed disclosure
requirement of any insurance business to state regulators. The state-based
requirements track roughly those of firms with publicly traded securities. Audited
reports of the insurance company’s financial and accounting situation must be
made quarterly and annually.57 These include disclosure of routine data, like the
firm’s balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows, as well as
more detailed information than generally required by securities laws, like a list of
every asset owned by the firm, every asset acquired or sold during the relevant
period, a report of all derivative transactions, and so on.
Although disclosure of the assets and risks of hedge funds and other
private wealth pools may indeed be a socially valuable regulation, there is no
obvious reason why this should be tied to a regulatory apparatus that is about
only a very small part of what a hedge fund may be doing or may have done. As
noted above, there are potentially tens of thousands of separate legal entities
participating in credit derivative markets at any time, and requiring each of them
to make disclosures to insurance regulators upon engaging in such activity is
highly problematic.
As a basic principle, disclosure regulation should be implemented and
monitored by regulators that cover the primary activity of the regulated entity. It
is for this reason that the SEC is the agency responsible for the disclosure by
firms issuing securities and by brokers and dealers that buy and sell securities,
and the reason that insurance regulators are responsible for the disclosure by
insurance firms. To require an investment fund to make disclosures to insurance
regulators solely because it engaged in a credit derivative transaction will impose
potentially large costs on funds based on potentially a single or small number of
transactions. If the disclosure rules are tied instead to how often a fund trades or
See, for example, N.Y. Ins. L. § 307(a) (requirement for filing an annual financial
statement) and § 308 (requirement for filing a quarterly financial statement).
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how many trades it makes in these markets, the funds will inevitably try to avoid
these costs by making the decisions on whether to sell protection based in part on
the arbitrary triggers. For example, if 10 incidents of protection selling trigger a
disclosure obligation, we shouldn’t be surprised to see funds selling protection 9
times.
If the reason for insurance-based disclosure rules is because of the lack of
disclosure to other regulators—hedge funds have little or no disclosure
obligations under the securities laws—this is not an argument for disclosure to
insurance regulators, it is an argument for a securities law disclosure regime. The
regulator that can best calibrate what kinds of disclosure are cost justified, what
form disclosures should be made in, and what to do with the disclosed
information, if anything, is the regulator that should require and monitor
disclosure. For one, it is not clear what insurance regulators would do with the
disclosures, especially if the bulk or almost all of it is about activities that are
unquestionably not insurance.
v.

Contract regulation

Fifth, state law generally requires insurance companies to submit
insurance contracts, known as “policies,” to state regulators for pre-approval
before any policies can be sold using the contract. For example, in New York,
contracts for life, accident, and health insurance are subject to prior regulatory
approval.58 This requirement would layer possible fifty different state law
requirements on top of existing private contracting in the over-the-counter credit
derivative markets. There are several problems with such a requirement.
Most obviously, as noted above, there is already a quasi-regulator, the
ISDA, that provides industry-wide boilerplate contracts for credit derivative
transactions. As the Conseco and Xerox examples above illustrate, ISDA is
already incorporating best practices into these standard contracts, as well as
modifying terms that cause problems regulators would be concerned about, such
as manipulation, externalities, and contractual unfairness that may have arisen
from any bargaining power asymmetries, mistakes, or the like. As such, contract
regulation is likely redundant, and would in any event be replacing a highly
knowledgeable set of regulators with one without any experience with credit
derivatives.
Paternalistic contract regulation to protect one party or the other is also
unnecessary because of the sophistication of the parties to these contracts. There
is no obvious systematic bias in favor of one party or the other in these contracts,
and the typical arguments that may justify contract form and substance
Under New York law, life, accident and health and annuity policy forms are subject to
prior regulatory approval. Compare N.Y. Ins. L. § 1102(a) with § 1108(a).
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regulation—for example, information or bargaining power asymmetries—do not
obtain or point always in one direction.
A final point has to do with the fact that the parties to credit derivative
contracts are not tied to physical locations in the way that insureds are, and
therefore any state-based regime will inevitably invite avoidance through
incorporation choice or choice of law provisions. This may be viewed as
normatively good or bad (the old race to the top versus race to the bottom
debate), but even where it might be thought of as generating efficient contract
forms that private parties would choose in any event, it would take us simply to
the current ISDA model. After all, if there were a more efficient set of contracts
that could be written—that is, the one that parties freely choosing would choose
anyway—it would exist or will exist under the current quasi-regulatory regime.
vi.

Price control

Finally, states impose substantive restrictions on the prices that can be
charged by insurance companies. Regulation of prices varies widely by state and
by the type of insurance, but a few common themes are apparent. There are
generally three types of regulation: pre-approval, “file and use,” and “use and
file,” with the strictness of the regulation decreasing accordingly. For example,
New York law requires prices for workers’ compensation and automobile
insurance to be approved in advance by regulators, while rates for property and
casualty insurance are subject only to a pre-issuance filing policy.59 The general
regulatory touchstone is that rates shall not be too high, too low, discriminatory,
or anticompetitive.60
Whatever sense price regulation makes for contracts written by insurance
companies, it makes much less sense for credit derivative products. Price
regulation of insurance contracts is premised on the pooling of large numbers of
individuals and on the governance problems described above. In contrast, credit
derivative prices are based on the idiosyncratic risk associated with particular
firms. This is something that is difficult to price in the abstract or to know when
prices are too high, too low, discriminatory, or the like. In addition, because the
price of risk is traded in markets, the idea of using regulators, especially ones
without any expertise or experience in this area, to set prices is nonsensical.
There is one area where the pricing of credit derivatives was erroneous. As
shown in recent research, price models used ubiquitously by buyers, sellers,
credit rating agencies, and other participants in the markets systematically

59 Compare N.Y. Ins. L. § 2305(b), § 2310(a), § 2344 and 11 N.Y.C.R.R. pt. 161, § 2303, and
§ 3231(d).
60 Id.
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mispriced various tranches of risk.61 It turns out that highly rated tranches were
underpriced, meaning they were riskier than buyers and sellers thought, and
unrated tranches were underpriced, meaning they were less risky than thought.62
Importantly, however, no one was aware of this problem, even though everyone
had strong incentives to be so. In addition, this kind of error is now known, and
parties to these contracts do not need regulators to tell them about it. Other
pricing issues might arise in the future, but market participants have incentives
to figure these out. The problem was not that the market for setting prices was
biased in one way or the other, but rather simply a mistake in assumptions.
Regulators are not well positioned to remedy these kinds of problems absent a
crystal ball that no one believes they have.
Moreover, if various states are competing with each other to offer market
participants pricing regulations that fit their needs, the jurisdictional choice point
made above will obtain—contracts will migrate to those states that offer the
pricing rules that the parties would have come to anyway.
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO INSURANCE REGULATION

It is understandable why people mistakenly analogize credit derivatives to
insurance: insurance is about risk sharing and diversification, and this is what
credit derivatives are about too. Insurance companies were also big players in
credit derivative markets. But other contracts are about these things as well, and
there were many other types of entities that participated in these markets. In
addition, credit derivatives are about many other things than risk sharing. In fact,
as shown above, credit derivatives may have started as a risk-sharing or risktransferring mechanism, but their primary use was and is speculation, hedging,
and other non-insurance-like functions. Moreover, even where the insurance
analogy is most apt, it does not follow that the current insurance regulatory
regime is the best available for credit derivatives, assuming additional regulation
is needed.
There may be a case for more regulation, premised on the failure of the
market to adequately address counterparty risk issues, but insurance law has
little to add. A simple rule requiring derivative contracts to be traded on an
exchange in most cases will do most of the work required.
As noted above, a credit derivative does not eliminate risk for the original
bearer of it, but simply trades default risk for counterparty risk. In other words,
the risk in a loan that the borrower will not repay is traded for the risk that the
61 See, for example, Joshua D. Coval, et al. “Economic Catastrophe Bonds," 99 Am. Econ. Rev.
628 (2009) (showing how AAA-rated tranches contained very little to no idiosyncratic risk, but
large and underappreciated amounts of systematic risk).
62 See id.
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seller of default protection will not pay in the event the borrower does not. This
counterparty risk was bigger than anyone thought; firms no one thought would
fail, like AIG, failed by taking on too much risk. This led to a cascade of failures of
brokers, like Lehman Brothers, and other intermediaries, which in turn led to
huge collateral calls and a general constriction of credit flows. Quite simply, the
mispricing of and realization of counterparty risk caused the credit crunch.63
Fortunately there is a somewhat simple solution to reducing counterparty
risk—an exchange. Using a centralized exchange, like the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, eliminates the counterparty risk, replacing it with the risk of default of
the exchange. If A and B have a contract that exposes A to a net of $100 in risk to
B, this risk can be eliminated if A and B both trade through a centralized
clearinghouse or exchange. A will now have a $100 liability to the clearinghouse,
while B will have a $100 credit with the same. If A defaults on its ability to pay B,
B can still be paid by the clearinghouse. As long as the clearinghouse is solvent,
the counterparty risk for B is eliminated.
The risk-reducing qualities of an exchange can be seen more clearly when
the number of trading parties increases. Consider the case where A is owed $100
by B, B is owed $90 by C, and C is owed $80 by A. In this case, A has a net risk
exposure of $180 to B and C, since if they both default, A is owed $100 from B
and owes $80 to C. If these three liabilities are managed through an exchange,
however, A’s risk exposure to B and C is reduced to zero. In this scenario, A is
owed $20 from the exchange, and B and C each owe the exchange $10. Thus, A’s
risk to B and C has been eliminated, and the netting of liabilities has reduced the
magnitude of the overall amounts owed to much more manageable sums. So long
as the exchange can ensure, say through margin requirements, that B and C can
make good on their $10 (about 10% of the total bets), the market stays together.
It is for this reason that the clearinghouse model is used for other
derivative markets, like commodities markets, futures markets, and currency
markets. Of course, the clearinghouse must be solvent and for this it needs
sufficient scale of operations and the ability to impose rules on trading parties
that help reduce the risk that they will not be able to make due on their contracts.
This last point is precisely about the locus of regulatory authority—who knows
better how to regulate the leverage or other characteristics of market
participants? Since the clearinghouse, typically a for-profit enterprise, stands to
lose personally and dramatically in the event of a failure, it has arguably better
incentives along this dimension than government regulators, who are not betting
their own money and who, perversely and ironically, may see increased funding
from any failures.

See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK (2009) (showing how the credit crunch was not
caused by a liquidity shortage but by an increase in counterparty risk).
63
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Given these benefits, the question is why the exchange did not arise as a
natural part of the market. One answer might be that an exchange has some
elements of a public good, since it reduces the potential for systemic risk by
decreasing the likelihood of a credit crunch from the failure of a single firm, and
public goods are chronically under supplied by the market. But the story here is
more complicated, because the analysis above suggests that it is in each
individual firm’s interest to reduce risk in this way. Moreover, the collective
action problems that typically cause the market to under supply public goods do
not obtain in this context, since there were only about eight major intermediary
market makers, and they were all located in New York City.
There must be, therefore, some benefit to writing contracts off exchange
that exceeded any benefits from counterparty risk reduction, at least in
expectation before the actual counterparty risks, like the failure of AIG, were
known. One possibility is that the brokerage houses arranging over-the-counter
credit default contracts are able to earn higher profits for writing specialized
contracts than they could for simply dealing in standardized contracts, as
typically required for exchange-traded contracts. There is less pricing
transparency in over-the-counter contracts, since they are written for a specific
buyer and seller in a one-off fashion, and there is also more work that arguably
goes into writing these contracts. And, private firms do not bear the full costs of
the over-the-counter system, since bankruptcy law limits the downside risk to
any investor to what they invested. Under this view, brokerage firms are able to
capture the private benefits of idiosyncratic, over-the-counter contracts, while
externalizing the risks of systemic meltdown of the entire system.
In this way, the government’s initial efforts to encourage the trading of
credit derivatives on an exchange is a sensible reform. Firms have resisted this to
date,64 because nothing has changed the private incentives with respect to
systemic risk—in fact, the rash of bailouts of private firms have arguably
exacerbated the problem. In addition, there are multiple competing exchanges,
including the CME and ICE exchanges, and academics have shown that
exchanges need a great amount of scale to be able to adequately reduce
counterparty risk.65 The government may be rightfully worried about choosing
one exchange as the preferred or exclusive exchange, but the need for scale may
force some collective choice to be made.
64 See, for example, Jacob Bunge, “NY Fed examines slow progress in CDS clearing,” WALL ST.
J. MARKETWATCH, Apr. 1, 2009, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ny-fedexamines-slow-progress-cds.
65 See Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu, “Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
Counterparty Risk?,” Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) Working Paper, (May 4, 2009) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348343 (showing how reductions in
counterparty risk is highly correlated with scale and the ability to net with other derivative
contracts).cr
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As noted above, the virtue of the exchange model is that it bakes into a
private-ordering system many of the laudable aspects of the insurance law
regime. Specifically, capital requirements, disclosure, pricing transparency, and
general oversight of risk are all functions that exchanges provide, since exchanges
are on the hook for losses arising from the failure of any of the market
participants. Moreover, insofar as there are multiple exchanges competing to act
as a clearinghouse, there will be competition in law making, which will increase
the chances of efficient rules being created. In the private model, there is also less
chance of regulatory capture or a public choice distortion, because rival
exchanges can always arise to offer market participants alternatives. This
assumes, however, that entry is relatively unrestricted, something that is not
necessarily true in a world where scale is so important and perhaps difficult to
achieve quickly. Insofar as this is true, some oversight of the exchange(s) may be
required to simply ensure that they are not subject to these shortcomings. A first
guess at a sensible regulator of the exchange(s) would be one of the existing
regulatory bodies that deals with exchanges (e.g., the SEC or CFTC) or the
regulators that deal with banks and systemic risk (e.g., the Federal Reserve or the
Treasury Department).
V.

CONCLUSION

This Essay has shown that the simple argument that some credit
derivatives help banks and other providers of debt share risk with other investors
is not sufficient for credit derivative contracts in general to be deemed
“insurance.” We have a separate body of insurance law not because the
underlying contracts are insurance, but rather because typical insurance
contracts are sold by insurance companies. It has also shown that the policy
justifications for regulation of insurance companies—an inverted production
cycle, weak corporate governance in bad times, and unsophisticated insureds—do
not obtain in the context of credit derivative markets or apply to parties to credit
derivative contracts. Finally, it has shown how an exchange for credit derivative
contracts can provide most if not all of the substantive regulation insurance
regulators can provide, at lower cost and in a more efficient manner. There
remain problems with the exchange solution, including issues of scale and bilateral netting, that remain to be solved, but this is a subject for another day.
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